



THE 'TERRORIST' OTHER IN BRITISH AND FRENCH IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION:
RELATING NEW ELEMENTS OF SECURITY DISCOURSE ARSENALS TO RHETORICAL
TOOLS OF THE PAST

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ABSTRACT

In an age where terrorist based national security rhetoric has received heightened attention in official discourses, this study investigates how legislative and linguistic trends in Britain and France are affecting their respective processes of contemporary identity construction. In these two states there has been an impressive passing of counter-terrorism legislation this century, greatly increasing legitimate state power and authority. It is the legitimation struggle surrounding such changes in power and how such controversial shifts have used language power to achieve largely material results that drives this project's investigation. Despite some evidence that state power is decreasing in the realm of national security, it seems to actually be increasing. Through a discourse analysis of official texts from 2000 to the present in Britain and France, this project hopes to achieve a more comprehensive, analytic mapping of how material and ideational powers connect and affect patterns of identity construction at the state level.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

While the roles of subnational groups and international organizations are gaining popularity in scholarly debates of political science, states remain key players in the game we call international relations. With regard to common themes such as power, legitimacy, security, and identity, “states” are in need of continued attention by folks hoping to better understand the puzzles inherent to such a field as “political science”. Governments hold a strong grip on elements of power, whether that be strictly material or otherwise, and *central* governments maintain a fierce hold on *other* spokes of power despite evidence of institutional restructuring, such as in the analyses of 21st century European multilevel governance, or the globalizing effect of multinational corporations.

One issue with resurging relevance in regard to government power is that of security, and in particular, the power found in the ever-present concept of “national security”. While the threat of mass armies literally landing on our shores, crossing our borders, and invading our towns is not gaining huge attention in current policy circles, there are plenty of other threats to discuss. In an age of identified “new” security threats, perhaps the most publicized and talked about is that of terrorism. National security agendas across the globe seem to be drawing upon the power of terrorism as an entity in itself and as a tool with which to gain increasing leverage in the construction of government purpose and identity. Active identity construction processes within governments can be linked in large part to agents in power

who utilize government agendas, such as counter-terrorism, to continually redefine and legitimize the state and its corresponding national identity.

This process of identity construction at the state level is intriguing to say the least as it is not just government officials but the public as well who often relate their identity to this fixed entity encapsulated within a geographic territory. Debates do circulate who present evidence to the contrary, for example, in the determination of regional and ethnic identities within and across national borders. Despite such reports it is difficult to foresee those types of identities super-ceding the role of national identities. Imagine, for example, the most global sporting event, the World Cup, being comprised of teams based not on national states but other groupings such as multinational corporations or subnational languages. While possible, it is not a realistic scenario, at least any time soon, and continued relevance of the state as a political and cultural power figure is unavoidable.

While it is a tricky endeavor to focus in on the process of identity construction, under constant metamorphosis, an investigation limited to the official discourses surrounding national security legislation may provide a more grounded frame with which to analyze state evolutions in the realm of identity construction. More specifically, recent legislation regarding the threat of terrorism to two large European states, Britain and France, will be the starting point for an in depth analysis of official discourses and language regarding national security in these two states.

Case Selection

The highlighted dimension of 'terrorist' exists in an already tenuous Self-Other framework of identity construction in France and Britain. Sensitivities surrounding

European integration, immigrant communities, and other influences on boundary construction within these states are high, and a search for greater understanding in how the current attention placed on terrorism is affecting such relationships has interesting potential. One wonders if the Self-Other relation in Britain and France with respect to national identity is possible to place within a contemporary time frame of intersubjective knowledge, or if it depends largely on an understanding based in more historically rooted structures of boundary formation and identity. These two states have been chosen as case studies due to their historical experience as colonizers in majority Muslim regions, struggles with terrorist activities within their particular state boundaries, and categorization as Western European democracies. The threat of terrorism flooding political agendas is joined by the flux in European integration and rise of immigration “issues”. Issues such as these in British and French discourses have reinvigorated a radical search for stable, national identities as more and more ‘Others’ seem to be a part of the evolving domestic unit.

As governments designate a need for new security policies there is a muddying of some traditional political boundaries while others seem to be in a process of hardening and resurrection. What is there to be learned from the current relationship between an identified ‘terrorist’ other in the official discourses surrounding counterterrorism legislation, and the processes of British and French national identity construction? Are current discourses introducing a new type of 21st century legislative, counterterrorism terminology to establish government legitimacy in matters of security, or are state actors perhaps merely resurrecting historical boundaries and concepts national identity in order to justify contemporary domestic endeavors?

Why Counter-Terrorism and Identity Construction Matter

There is much at stake regarding national security initiatives focused on terrorism in Britain and France. With the current focus of terrorism being that of Islamic extremist groups, it has been extremely difficult for governments to not engage in an infringement over the civil liberties of their respective societies while drafting new legal strategies. Compounding the difficulty of such effects on society ranging from ethnic profiling to a lack of privacy is the already challenging national identity construction processes at work in these two countries. As seen in the rioting in French *banlieus* surrounding Paris in the fall of 2005 as well as in the revelation that the July 7, 2005 bombers in London were British citizens, the socio-political environments of Britain and France are fragile to say the least.

What mechanisms are at work to incite such intense violence within marginalized factions of society in two of the most advanced democracies in the world? In looking at 21st century events in Britain and France, it seems national security is at a risk by their own citizens within their own borders. It is worrisome to think that the government's response to combat such violence and harms on its own soil seems to be having an adverse effect. Rather than strengthening domestic security and alleviating societal fears, it appears that marginalized groups of society are being further marginalized and driven to violence against their own states. Boundaries that increase societal divides rather than aid in collective identity construction to help bridge society's cleavages may have the potential to reinforce actual terrorist threats to national security. There seems to be an unfortunate gap in studies of domestic unrest, where on the one hand we see work focused on domestic issues such as immigration and economic equality, and on the other hand we see work focused on a sort of material-based investigation of national security concerns.

Immigration studies point to its place as a priority on European political agendas due to “rapid social and economic changes,” where “many people feel threatened and insecure and nativist politicians have been quick to blame minority and immigrant groups” for what is causing problems in their respective states¹. In another study that investigates immigration and other marginalized groups of European societies, successful political tactics based in nationalism and racial attributes have taken place through the “construction of the alien” in European society in order to identify what it is to be “European”². Such boundary construction processes increasing societal disconnect is not limited to immigration, but can also be seen in government policies targeting other domestic issues such as drugs. Continuing with ideas of racial and ethnic categorization by government initiatives, another analysis revealed how “drugs are targeted to the exterior category of race” in how the hierarchical structure in the drug trade combines with the role of boundaries to maintain certain social inequalities, reinforcing dangerous social cleavages³. If government discourses regarding terrorism are similar to those surrounding immigration and drug wars, perhaps the consequent identity construction within the national boundaries of Britain and France has more explosive potential than is currently acknowledged.

Unfortunately, despite various evidence of social fragmentation affecting identity construction and aspects of national security, the majority of government efforts seem to encompass more restrictive measures to combat terrorism, with greater powers bestowed upon government politicians and law enforcement. Ironically, in the new, more repressive counter-terrorism measures passed by both of these countries, it would seem there may be a

¹ Michael Tonry, ed., *Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 2.

² Gallya Lahav, *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 158.

³ Cathy Lisa Schneider, “Racism, Drug Policy, and AIDS,” *Political Science Quarterly* 113 (1998): 434.

potential to *increase* the actual security risk to these two societies rather than decrease security threats, due in large part to the possibility for political initiatives to reinforce existing social cleavages. Racism and xenophobia are far from “dead” in Britain and France despite increasing European integration, educational advances, and economic globalization that one would hope could spark more openness in societies. Government policy may aid in the reinforcement of discriminating boundaries between marginalized groups of society leading to increasingly damaging social fragmentation and violence.

It is this reinforcement of societal disconnect through an absence of broader identity constructions to incorporate all citizens that is troubling, especially as recent terrorist activity has been enacted by European citizens living in the same states they attack. As government power is viewed with enough caution for people to support policies of checks and balances, judicial oversight, and independent reviews toward government decisions, this era of increasing security concerns and corresponding political decisions should garner more scrutiny. The power unleashed to a select few agents from national security strategies, as seen in counter-terrorism legislation, along with the corresponding evidence that societies in Britain and France are experiencing increasing fragmentation and infringement of civil liberties, demands an in depth investigation of the relationship between state power, security, and identity.

One scholar’s investigation of security and identity states that “for the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the “inside” are linked through a discourse of “danger” with threats identified and located on the “outside”, opening the door for more specific studies of state

identity and national security relationships⁴. However, what happens to socio-political relations when the dangerous 'outside' is also a component of the not dangerous 'inside'? It is this intersection of international security concerns, domestic identity construction, and political language power that frames this state comparison across Britain and France in their policies regarding counter-terrorism.

⁴ David Campbell, *Writing Security* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992) 68.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW: INTERESTING AND FRUSTRATING

Scholarly contributions focused on international relations theory, the state, borders and boundaries, power in IR, and identity are elements of political science scholarly work that invigorated this project's curiosity due to their illuminating analyses, as well as their unsatisfactory weak spots. While there is much research on particular aspects of this project's discussion listed above, many of the corresponding conclusions remain isolated from other components of political science paradigms and consequently, leave room for a more comprehensive analysis that can cross apply such issues. While this is one major weakness of many current research productions, it is nothing more than one more obstacle to overcome from which a greater understanding of identity and security will hopefully present itself.

International Relations Theory

One scholar explains the three major theoretical debates in international relations to be realism, institutionalism, and liberalism, stating how "Realism highlights the distribution of resources. Institutionalism highlights the institutionalized distribution of information. Liberalism highlights the distribution of underlying societal interests and ideals as represented by domestic political institutions."⁵ While this certainly touches on the major theories that focus on material power and resources, it leaves out an important family of theorists that incorporate normative factors of IR puzzles into their research frameworks,

⁵ Andrew Moravcsik, "Is something rotten in the state of Denmark? Constructivism and European integration," *Journal of European Public Policy* 6:4 (1999): 669.

the constructivists. Even though scholars such as Moravcsik criticize the results of this group as “a generation of spurious confirmation”⁶ due to their overemphasis of claiming “variation in underlying state preferences, alongside appropriate rhetoric, as decisive evidence for constructivist theory”⁷, there is something to be said about such “appropriate rhetoric”. Indeed, among constructivists themselves there have been recent efforts to refine and strengthen the theoretical arguments focused on the role of rhetoric.

Rhetoric and language have considerable weight in affecting choices and behavior, in particular with regard to identity construction. Constructivists are a broad group of scholars concerned with taking various aspects of all sides and blending them with a renewed focus on more ideational factors, stating how both realist and liberal explanations “need to be complemented by approaches that emphasize the interaction of international and domestic influences on state behavior and take the role of ideas—knowledge, values, and strategic concepts—seriously”⁸. Constructivists do agree with realists in that interests inform choices, however, neorealists say those interests are exogenous while constructivists view interests as subject to change and reinterpretation⁹. Constructivism acknowledges the role of practice and process along with interest and resources to better understand international relations paradigms. It is this explicit discussion of *process* that is needed to guide this project of identity and terrorist rhetoric, as realist, liberal and institutional accounts do not expand their frameworks in a way to satisfyingly look at such discursive potential.

⁶ Andrew Moravcsik, “Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it Landed Yet?,” *European Union Politics* 2:2 (1999): 227.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” *International Organization* 48:2 (Spring 1994) 186.

⁹ Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” *International Security* 23:1 (1998): 175.

To better understand how national security discourses focused around terrorism relates to French and British identity construction, it is essential to approach the issue from a frame that encompasses both normative and material influences from emerging concepts of identity construction to more traditional notions of political power. Some constructivists place a priority on symbolic and cultural factors apart from the more realist inspired material factors. However, it does not make much sense to separate such concepts from “the material dimensions of social interaction,” especially when this project is focused on a topic such as national security that clearly has material implications¹⁰. The social and material environment where agents take action in IR is what provides agents with some understandings of their interests¹¹, and consequently, it can be seen how both neorealist accounts of national security policy as well as early constructivist projects placing priority on normative factors are both inadequate for the objectives of this particular project. Realist approaches to understanding interests maintain that they are a given and relatively the same across states, but in a world of constantly changing power structures and societal dynamics, reducing interests to such a simple level is very limiting to a research project investigating the relationship between identity construction and national security policy initiatives.

The constructivist mention of “setting” helps the researcher broaden their pool of potential interests that IR agents may be drawing upon to influence their choices and material consequences. It establishes the possibilities for actors to have shifting interests despite similar, direct material and cultural influences due to the potential of those actors’ environment and the collective meanings it may imply on decisions. It is also stated that

¹⁰ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon, “Globalization, the Comparative Method, and Comparing Constructions,” in *Constructivism and Comparative Politics*, ed. Daniel M. Greene (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 110.

¹¹ Jeffrey Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” *World Politics* 50:2 (1998): 325.

most constructivists “aim to “denaturalize” the social world, that is, to empirically discover and reveal how the institutions and practices and identities that people take as natural, given, or matter of fact, are, in fact, the product of human agency, of social construction”¹². IR theories based in neorealist or neoliberal frames too often use a set of given interests as a type of tool kit in order to try and predict political action from various chosen examples and quantitative statistics. This does not leave any kind of satisfactory understanding for someone looking to better comprehend political science outcomes that do not “make senses,” such as how the Terrorist Other in Britain can be both British and not British for example.

Looking into processes of construction in this way allows for the researcher to investigate relations across subjects rather than viewing said subjects as separate entities. This relational technique allows for the researcher to identify mutual constitution among actors in political science and potentially develop a greater understanding of political science puzzles. Interests and structures and agents and outcomes cannot be precisely distinguished from each other in looking at cause and effect in political relations, and popular theoretical approaches used to understand national security policies are insufficient as they have yet to incorporate this concept of mutual constitution into concrete analyses of policy evolution.

It is with this mutually constitutive angle that the concept of intersubjective knowledge, crucial to this project, can be more smoothly introduced. One theorist states that “meaningful behavior, or action, is possible only within an intersubjective social context...through the media of norms and practices,” approaching the issue of identity construction in stating that “constitutive norms define an identity by specifying the actions

¹² Hopf, 182.

that will cause Others to recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately”¹³. There is an important dynamic here relating at once a collective understanding or meaning that helps inform actors of their relations while leaving space for interpretation and process.

The idea of space for interpretation is key for a constructivist research approach in that temporality and practice are invaluable to the analyst looking for greater understanding in complex socio-political relationships, and identity should be treated as “an empirical question to be theorized within a historical context,” not just another normative evaluation of current cultural traditions¹⁴. Context is not a static component to politics, and whether the political scientist focuses on a more literal context such as the EU’s effect on boundary definition, or a more figurative context such as evolving social norms, contextual metamorphosis is essential to comprehensive investigations in the field of international relations.

In agreement with poststructuralist analysts who state that “representations and policy are mutually constitutive and discursively linked”¹⁵, it can be seen how legislative initiatives by the state to enhance national security encompass a deployment of material power and resources as well as a normative expression of the current political context. One cannot stay within the realm of neorealism’s focus on given state interests or neoliberalism’s dependence on bargaining and interests in order to gain a greater understanding of national security evolutions. The influence of “rule”, “authority”, and “legitimacy” is not limited to their common, traditional definitions found in classic texts from one of the IR theory “isms”, but needs to be investigated in a way that includes the dimension of both language

¹³ Hopf, 173.

¹⁴ Ibid., 175.

¹⁵ Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice*. London: Routledge, 2006), 28.

and rhetoric in international affairs to help capture the processes endemic to international affairs.

The State and Its Interests

Despite the border between international and domestic politics becoming blurred in light of globalization, new security threats and immigration among other topics, much of IR literature still seems to separate the two political spheres in unhelpful ways. In comparative politics, while writings on nationalism and political parties in Europe incorporate enlightening explanations of changing domestic political agendas and power relations, they often leave out the international context, unless in general terms. Similarly, international security work has presented interesting findings on developments in military operations and international organizations, however, they seem to ignore important national and subnational normative dimensions of power in their analyses.

Despite the above criticisms, there are a few notable examples of scholars bridging the all too common gap between normative power and security interests in IR literature. Alexander Wendt applies constructivist frames to the concept of the sovereign state defining its existence as “an ongoing accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for-all creation of norms that somehow exist apart from practice” reiterating the importance of practice and movement in understanding state behavior¹⁶. Unfortunately, this literature does not go on to dimensions of explicit changes in policy with respect to national security and corresponding evolutions of intersubjective knowledge due to powerful discourses.

¹⁶ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46:2 (1992) 413.

Taking the role of practice to the concept of identity, the idea of the state as the sovereign presence in world politics is produced by “a discourse of primary and stable identity,” and the identity of any state should be understood as “tenuously constituted in time...through *a stylized repetition of acts*”¹⁷. Of particular interest when looking at such practice and “acts” is the arena of foreign policy, where language and material power connect in a way that almost parallels the joining of domestic and international level priorities. David Campbell notes that foreign policy, especially in its form of “rational security policy”, is “a discourse of power that is global in scope yet national in its legitimation”¹⁸. In looking at foreign policy discourses, he also touches on the role of “danger,” an important concept as even when concrete dangers dependent on force such as armies and the like is not especially evident “danger” continues to be a huge point of power when spilling from the lips of political elites. Unfortunately, while this literature introduces the idea of foreign policy discourses as deployments of power worth as much attention as armies building up their weapons supplies, it does not tackle the consequences of current security initiatives focused explicitly on the danger or threat of terrorism.

Danger has been observed as “an effect of interpretation...that process of interpretation does not depend on the incidence of “objective” factors for its veracity”¹⁹. So here the state can utilize its language power for legitimation in the absence of any material facts to continue reigning in control. This is relevant analysis for the question of this study as it points to the influential relationship between discourse and constructions of reality with respect to security interests. States such as Britain and France continue to exert exceptional

¹⁷ Campbell, 10.

¹⁸ Ibid., 70.

¹⁹ Ibid.

power, both over their respective populations as well as the international community, and the realm of foreign policy is a space in which state figures can continue to dominate intersubjective understanding across all potential audiences. It is extremely difficult for any kind of argument to counter the various state-led foreign policy decisions since there is no other institution or actor with as much access and power as state representatives. Not only do these structural obstacles reinforce the state's monopoly over foreign policy strategies but the very notion of a "foreign" policy implies the need for government agendas and policy that recognize a major distinction between the "state" and "everyone else".

A major factor constantly under transformation among states is that of their identity, and security discourses are ideal canvasses for officials to affect conceptions of the self. Foreign policy responsibilities present government with opportunities to exert power, but how that power is interpreted and utilized by the people is ultimately out of their control. The key to theories of normative power can be seen in the words of Foucault who says that governing people, rather than a way to force people in a particular path, is always "a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself"²⁰. Another study states how "what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future."²¹. What is interesting here is the role of the individual, subject, citizen, whatever name you wish to attach to that person "under" the political official, in aiding the state in its identity construction and processes of coercion. The success or failure of state directed

²⁰ Michel Foucault, "About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth," *Political Theory* 21:2 (1993): 204.

²¹ Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8:4 (1982): 788.

coercive policies to continue its legitimacy depends on the interpretation and consequent actions of everyone else “below” national officials.

Other scholars look into relationships of power under different categories of representation and deployment. For example, some theoretical perspectives delve into the realm of “authority”, specifying the importance of “subjects” in viewing authority not as a relation, stating that “This relation has two elements: the use of power and the acceptance of its use by others. Authority is the legitimate exercise of power.”²² These ideas demonstrate the paradox of power in the hands of government in that the ultimate control from the state seems to be largely dependent on a lack of literal control over the people. One of the ways government gain a sort of legitimate authority from relinquishing control over their citizens is through the construction of national identities that would elicit support from the public.

In constructing a stable state identity, political elites are simultaneously legitimizing their activities and overall control, even in the absence of an objective threat. Lene Hansen would seem to agree with this, stating how in her analyses “the state only knows who and what it is through its juxtaposition against the radical, threatening Other”²³. The existence of this dangerous Other is frequently articulated from state officials in national security discourses. These texts, in identifying threats even if not clarifying the “Self” in explicit terms, are both a means to reinforce government power in security strategies while also directing identity construction in such a way to continue excluding anything resembling that “Other”. Looking back on historical moments we can see various instances of this Other in national security discourses stemming from political officials.

²² Nicholas Onuf and Frank F. Klink, “Anarchy, Authority, Rule,” *International Studies Quarterly* 33:2 (June 1989): 151-152.

²³ Hansen, 34.

Perhaps most frequently cited are snippets from the Cold War era. “Communists” “Soviets”, and anything East of a particular area was articulated to be against the major capitalist countries of the time, and state officials were relatively successful maintaining such coercive rhetoric. They constructed and reinforced geographic lines of distinction from one identity to another, applying such spatial boundaries to more social boundaries within their respective states. It is now 2007, and even with globalization in full force, not to mention the changing nature of borders in Europe due to enlargement, boundaries continue to play a role in state policies even as they continue to be insufficient in stabilizing state identity conceptions.

Boundaries and Other Spatial “Organizers”

The role of boundaries, from concrete “lines” such as walls around particular parts of town to more fluid versions such as those based on categories like ethnicity or income, can be seen in an array of scholarly literature, and are of great importance when looking at ideas of identity construction and traditional international relations topics such as security. It has been stated that “to understand identity as *spatially* constructed is to reiterate that identity is relationally constituted and always involves the construction of boundaries and thereby the delineation of space”²⁴. Other literature argues that boundaries are formed around different categories of people to create and reinforce structural inequalities, for example a terrorist ‘Other’ versus a national ‘Self’, through mechanisms labeled opportunity hoarding, where one group monopolizes a resource, and exploitation, where elites maximize their utility

²⁴ Hansen, 47.

through using outsiders without full compensation²⁵. These boundaries are then maintained by reproducing organizational structures existing elsewhere (emulation) and continually adapted due to their interest in maintaining its effect on inequality (adaptation)²⁶.

While this analytic framework opens up some great avenues for understanding identity construction and boundaries, it does not provide any synthesis with particular mention of national security or language, and consequently leaves the reader with continued questions regarding boundaries surrounding counter-terrorism rhetoric. The addition of these components through their representations in official discourses is necessary in order to apply ideas such as how daily social practices help a state reproduce its identity while simultaneously understanding others based on the identity it gives them²⁷, to better understand contemporary identity construction and the effect of borders. This is exciting as it goes outside the neorealist box of material interests, but it is not adequate in that it leaves some lingering questions of comprehensiveness due to its exclusion of other important influences, such as language power.

Language Power Meets the Material Girl of IR

From the dominant realist camp of American IR scholars to men in suits on Washington's Capitol Hill, there seems to be an overemphasis on material powers such as military capability and economic resources in attempts at finding some kind of "rational" or even "logical" explanation for international affairs paradigms. While there are some influential writers who express a conviction that power entails complex relations, that we

²⁵ Charles Tilly, *Durable Inequality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 10, 13.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 95, 97.

²⁷ Hopf, 175.

“must not understand the exercise of power as pure violence or strict coercion”²⁸, they do not apply such important philosophical insights to many empirical projects of social science.

Luckily, more and more research scholars are drawing on this complexity of power by putting other sources such as language to the test in their pursuit to better understand world affairs. One theorist explains this expanding perspective as looking into international politics as a game, where “language defines the logic of possibility underlying the structure of world politics,” that interests and threats are “constructed through the rules of language, not by raw material capability”²⁹. It makes sense that language and discourse would help inform a state of its interests and threats, but what about how this “threat information” in turn affects identity construction? While material capabilities and resources alone are not enough to understand state interests and perceived threats, they are still a necessary component to the study of national security policy-making and need to be incorporated along with more linguistic elements to understand contemporary processes of identity construction.

One means through which language and identity construction join forces is through an “unstable system of signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and difference”³⁰. This would seem to indicate that as political officials utilize language power in identifying security threats and interests, they might also be in a process of identity construction through such an identification of that threat by way of various mutually constitutive interplays of policy. The gap between official discourse and language power is somewhat through the concept that “identities need to be articulated in language to have political and analytical presence and they are thus dependent on political agency for

²⁸ Foucault 1993, 204.

²⁹ Peter Howard, “Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S. Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 813, 825.

³⁰ Hansen, 17.

their ontological and epistemological significance”³¹. Consequently, the realist notion of material power and political elites remains a significant aspect of policy making, however, in order for such resources to embrace their full influence they work hand in hand with linguistic tools and processes.

One way language has taken a place in power capacity comparable to traditional material sources is through what Janice Bially Mattern calls *representational force*; “an effort to reproduce the status quo narrative”³². Language is not a strict, coercive force in the literal sense, rather, a method of representation in which the context surrounding decision making is tailored to fit the intention of various political decision makers without allowing tons of space for other interpretation. It is this “less material” force in conjunction with more traditional, realist ideas of force that is important for this project. Narratives and representational force provide enough strength and power for policy initiatives to gain legitimacy and their designers to maintain authority. This pairing of normative and material ends of the power spectrum is essential to the theoretical approach undertaken in this project. While such literature on language power is helpful considering the various weaknesses of IR theory and state interest based reports, it is essential to have an understanding of how scholarly work particular to the workings of identity construction has been both insightful and disappointing for this project on terrorism and identity in Britain and France.

³¹ Hansen, 23-24.

³² Janice Bially Mattern, *Ordering International Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 14.

An Abstract Discussion of Identity Construction and Security

Issues of identity, especially in the field of IR, provide a fascinating frame from which to investigate intersections of more traditional political science topics such as national security with more contemporary ideas connected to social theory. In looking at collective identity formation literature “the discipline [IR] may not only arrive at a fuller understanding of the international system of states, but it may also finally give an ontological status to the sundry subjects or “actors” in world politics”³³. With the overriding goal of this project to gain higher satisfaction in understanding some aspects of the relationship between power and legitimacy in security discourses, using identity construction has motivating potential. While Britain and France are not necessarily undergoing an intense state-building process that one may expect to precipitate a study of identity construction, there is evidence of continued, powerful effort to affect national identity from state authorities.

State-level authorities continue to represent a certain element of national representation in a more social and cultural way in light of increasing globalisation, the changing definition of borders, and evolving societal dynamics. These responsibilities taken on by official British and French politicians relate to each other in how their existence is dependent on a certain back and forth relationship from national security needs to intersubjective understandings of national identity. On the one hand, identity construction in contemporary Britain and France at the state level seems to be a driver of national security discourses as it aids in the legitimation of elite-driven government policy, while on the other hand, these same discourses identifying national security threats seem to be a key component to evolving concepts of national identity. While the concept of national security legitimation

³³ Iver Neumann, *Uses of the Other*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 1.

and identity construction as mutually constitutive elements of the political science realm adds significant complexity to this project's theoretical and empirical analyses, it is this relational nexus that is so intriguing and has such potential that is the overall driving force.

One interesting parallel between elements of national security and identity construction is their consistent dependence on the concept of boundaries in order to maintain a "real" existence in political discourse. The use of boundaries in political rhetoric spans from material definitions such as border controls and air space, to more figurative concepts such as racial distinctions and ethnicity. Top government officials use their language power through the incitement of both material and figurative boundary conceptions to aid in the intersubjective knowledge and understanding essential for collective identity construction. With boundaries continually created and redefined by those in positions of authority, the focus of identity construction studies should "be the socially placed one of how these boundaries come into existence and are maintained"³⁴. In this case of this project, national security discourses will provide the empirical framework from which to analyze boundary maintenance at the state level and corresponding national identity construction.

In addition to the role boundaries play in identity construction in the IR arena, it is necessary to have a focus of identity formation that goes beyond the general "self/other" nexus. Two main concepts from scholarly literature come to mind in thinking of a more specific identity construction and security evolution in Britain and France: the deployment of the "terrorist Other" in relation to previous "Others," and the changing role of nationalism. Recent work on identity construction in Europe concludes "the East" as "indeed Europe's

³⁴ Neumann, 35.

other...continuously being recycled in order to represent European identities” and that “The question is not *whether* the East will be used in the forging of new European identities but *how* this is being done.”³⁵. With terrorism as the current prominent national security threat as stated by British and French officials and their corresponding new policy initiatives, it will be interesting to see how the “terrorist Other” is linked to the ever present “Eastern Other” of European identities.

Identity research focused on the historical evolution of the an Eastern European other highlights how with “the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the 1908 revolution of the Young Turks and the defeat in World War I, a representation of Turkey began to take shape as a normalizing and modernizing nation...the transformation from a sick man to a reborn and young body politic also made “the Turk” less central as a constitutive other”³⁶. This may imply that for a “terrorist” other to become less of an “other” states such as Britain and France need to be in some process of “normalizing the terrorist,” but current legislative initiatives and discourses point to anything but greater societal integration when it comes to potential others of British and French societies.

Getting away from the “Islamic Eastern Other” for a stint, we see in more recent history of the Cold War how the dichotomy of “totalitarian/authoritarian” replaced the previously dominant dichotomies of civilized/barbarian and European/Asian” to integrate Russia as more a part of the “Self” than the “Other” as new dichotomies such as “free/unfree, market/plan, West/East, defensive/offensive” became more prevalent³⁷. Interestingly, Russia transitioned from Eastern Other not because it was becoming more like

³⁵ Neumann, 207.

³⁶ Ibid., 60.

³⁷ Ibid., 103.

the Western “us” but because if “Russia is “learning” successfully, it is expected to become less of a threat”³⁸. If nothing else, such revelations of identity reveal how illogical conceptions of any kind of tangible “Eastern Other” actually are, rather, how they are continually modified and manipulated through changing intersubjective meanings directed from the state to become either more or less like the “Self”.

Indeed, identity construction and concepts of the self and other are not confined to any primordial, biological, or “real” definitions. This absence of fact of existence does not minimize the power of identity, however, in its effect on political decision-making and legitimation processes. Ethnographic research has shown that “human collectives are not more or less “real” for being imagined and for sustaining themselves by means of narratives of selves,” and these narratives are sources of both power as well as authority for political elites striving for successful policy initiatives³⁹. As political elites design political programs based on the existence of a particular “nation” they are also designing a type of prehistory of that nation to place it in a kind of tangible context through identifying “a host of political ties, cultural similarities, economic transactional patterns, and so on” in order to create relevance for the collective identity in question⁴⁰. Consequently, substantial power resides in the hands of such political actors in that it is their ultimate perspective and choice of descriptions that create the basis for what a particular identity is or is not.

With British and French political officials restructuring their legal codes giving the state unprecedented amounts of power while potentially superceding civil liberties and citizen rights, it is essential to understand how such policies became acceptable and

³⁸ Neumann, 107-108.

³⁹ Ibid, 26.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 115.

legitimate in the eyes of the public as well as in other political elites. As the legislative measures are in large part aimed at *preventing* national security threats rather than *reacting* to them, there are not many factual examples or reasons these governments can give their electorates in order to justify such dramatic increases in state power. It is this twist of an IR puzzle that demands a new theoretical approach, and studies on identity construction should aid in a greater understanding.

While such literature focused on variations of the self/other nexus are helpful, they do not adequately provide the researcher with enough of a framework to engage in a cross-state comparison such as this. While identity construction is seen in various IR specific research, the concept of nationalism as a type of collective identity process is more frequently found in the work of comparativists. Especially as this project is in pursuit of a cross-state study of two Western European states, the evolution and role of nationalism is of particular interest. As European states began to form and this state system “institutionalized the realm of the international as the realm of difference, the coming of nationalism raised the insistence on identity inside the state to new heights,” and it is this political insistence on an internal collective conception of the self that leads the following discussion of nationalism⁴¹.

Nationalism is a process in and of itself and should be used by the researcher as a “practical category, institutionalized form, and contingent event” from which to pursue empirical studies of political paradigms and study “the ways it [nationalism] can come to structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organize discourse and political action”⁴². This is not to say that nationalism should be viewed as a “force” that either resurges or recedes, but as “a heterogeneous set of “nation”-oriented idioms, practices, and

⁴¹ Neumann, 29.

⁴² Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7.

possibilities that are continuously available or “endemic” in modern cultural and political life”⁴³. Language and discourses are key sources from which to discern the deployment of such idioms and practices, reinforcing the use of a textual analysis in order to see how processes of identity construction interact with national security initiatives.

Unfortunately, much of the literature focused on nationalism in comparative politics leaves out what one may call established, modern democracies, and instead focuses on “newer” states such as those of the Former Soviet Union. Such literature defines a nationalizing state to be “the state *of* and *for* a particular ethnocultural “core nation” whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare, and political hegemony must be protected and promoted by the state” with key elements here being “the sense of “ownership” of the state by a particular ethnocultural nation that is conceived as distinct from the citizenry or permanent resident population as a whole, and...the “remedial” or “compensatory” project of using state power to promote the core nation’s specific (and heretofore inadequately served) interests”⁴⁴. As terrorists have been defined as “the Other” in official discourses and legislation while at the same time some convicted terrorists (i.e. Others) such as the London bombers of July 7, 2005 have been identified as British citizens, and consequently a part of “the Self,” could we not categorize Britain as a nationalizing state where the government is attempting to establish a particular ethnocultural nation to base collective identity and political power?

These concepts of nationalism need to be incorporated into projects of national security in order to broaden our scope of understanding current political puzzles traditionally relegated to neorealist studies of strictly material power. Studies pointing to “the relatively

⁴³ Brubaker, 10.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 103-104.

sudden and pervasive “nationalization” of public and even private life” based in evaluations of former Soviet republics provide reports of a “silencing or marginalization of alternative, non-nationalist political languages...the nullification of complex identities by the terrible categorical simplicity of ascribed nationality...essentialist, demonizing characterizations of the national “other,” characterizations that transform Serbs into Chetniks, Croats into Ustahas, Muslims into Fundamentalists”⁴⁵. This is enlightening with respect to more contemporary aspects of traditional “state” and “nation-building,” but what about if such nationalization practices were incorporated into studies of established democratic states such as Britain and France?

As the European Union is ever expanding its geographical nature, globalization increases communication possibilities, and migration changes the dynamics of British and French societies, one may hypothesize an expanding concept of the “Self” in such locales. However, one may equally hypothesize a resurgence of more nationalistic narratives and linguistic deployments by political elites. While there is surely no black or white response to such thoughts, through the use of discourse analysis, processes of identity construction and national security policy formation can be analyzed within a more comprehensive research framework than previous templates focused either solely on the material nature of international security and the balance of power or those focused primarily on cultural evolutions in normative thinking.

⁴⁵ Brubaker, 20-21.

Discourse Analysis as an Appropriate Methodology

Using methods of discourse analysis similar to those found in Lene Hansen's book *Security as Practice*, as well as research frameworks seen in the works of David Campbell and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, a tracing of what may be called "terrorist rhetoric" beginning with 21st century legislation will hopefully provide an interesting and structured look into the evolution of counterterrorism security policies and national identity in Britain and France. In order to capture a process such as identity construction within national security policies it is necessary to have a methodology that can at once capture the fluid nature of identity construction while also adhering to the unavoidably "concrete," historical nature of political decision-making and policy shifts.

Textual investigations provide a methodology that places a certain priority on language that is too often brushed by in other political science accounts. Elements of persuasion and coercion are not limited to material force, but can in fact occur through linguistic deployments of power. One such example of this that shines through empirics based in a discourse analysis is that of rhetorical coercion. This power of language in arguments need not have obvious persuasive measures to have effect. Rather, the "more immediate task is, through skillful framing, to leave their opponents without access to the rhetorical materials needed to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal. Rhetorical coercion occurs when this strategy proves successful: when the claimant's opponents have been talked into a corner, compelled to endorse a stance they would otherwise reject"⁴⁶.

Counter-terrorist legislation is an ideal source from which to investigate the potential of rhetorical coercion to affect policy and identity. Despite the identification of terrorist

⁴⁶ Krebs, Ronald and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric." *European Journal of International Relation* 13:1 (2007): 35.

threats as strictly predictive and rather abstract at this stage in policy-making processes, it is hard to imagine any official rebutting the concept that terrorism is a threat to security and should be prevented by the government through law enforcement, surveillance, and defense. Even without any factual evidence to claim a terrorist event is imminent, it is hard to develop any kind of “socially sustainable rebuttal” in opposition to legislation with an objective to prevent violent, terrorist activity against the state and its citizens.

From this identification of rhetorical coercion, and consequently, language power, by way of discourse analysis methodology, the path of analysis also incorporates more general ethnographic approaches to capture the relationship between identity construction and national security. It is said that “an ethnographic story proceeds through an intellectual examination of evidence to eventually reach its contributing central idea,” thereby placing the end result of field work as itself a product of process rather than a scripted research agenda with conclusive ideals taking over before the actual empirics begin⁴⁷. This approach is equally applicable when conducting research through a textual analysis of official discourses rather than strictly traditional modes of ethnographic fieldwork. One of the important methodological components to this thesis is the conscious effort to put any preconceived notions on the mental back burner until after the texts have been analyzed.

Before doing this however, it is important to further discuss why discourse analysis is an appropriate methodological choice in trying to better understand the back and forth connections of terrorist rhetoric in legislation and contemporary identity construction in Britain and France. Using discourse analysis as the foundation for this paper’s methodology depends heavily on some specific sources and their consequent empirical tools. One tool is

⁴⁷ Robert M. Emerson, Rachel I. Fretz and Linda L. Shaw, 1995. *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 170-171.

that of the identification rhetorical commonplaces within textual accounts and discourse in order to see how different intersubjective meanings come to dominate the collective knowledge among a certain group⁴⁸. While this piece of research used an investigation of context, practices, and public presentation to examine how a Soviet threat “was produced in a socially sustainable manner by the deployment of rhetorical commonplaces and discursive resources,” such methodological tools that discover certain patterns in official discourses can be applied in dimensions other than the invention of “the West” and corresponding Soviet threat evolutions⁴⁹. Rhetorical commonplaces are an empirical means to establish greater understandings of how language can evolve in political decision making to establish legitimacy of state power and authority while continually redefining and constructing particulars of the intersubjective knowledge.

The overriding goal of discourse analysis is “to ‘incorporate’ material and ideational factors rather than to privilege one over the other”⁵⁰. With “the theoretical—and ontological—core assumption is that representations and policy are mutually constitutive and discursively linked,” it is hard to distinguish the theoretical underpinnings basing a discourse analysis as methodology with the more philosophical approach a project may entail⁵¹. Textual analysis as methodology allows the political science researcher to examine traditional elements of power and security through an empirical process without having to ignore elements often relegated to social theory or philosophy such as collective meanings and socio-political processes.

⁴⁸ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2006), 312.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁵⁰ Hansen, 23.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 28.

In order to maintain authority in certain aspects of political decision-making, for example in new counter-terrorism legislation, the government's authority rests in an acceptance and active agreement of said authority by the public. One way of proclaiming the state as a legitimate power over citizen's rights could be seen in a collective identity construction process. The fluidity of identity construction and the concreteness of legislative proclamations span a spectrum of political elements that can be best captured analytically through a discourse analysis.

CHAPTER 3

LIMITATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL DIRECTION

Following a systematic approach to textual analyses aids in keeping conceptual tendencies at bay while maintaining a priority on empirics. First, it is important to decide what types of texts will be used. Poststructuralist discourse analysis is often begun by deciding how large the spectrum of textual genres should be, for example, should the study focus purely on foreign policy documents or include media resources as well⁵². For this study looking at the relationship between national security and identity the texts under investigation will remain official documents and will not open up the option for other genres. While media documents and popular culture texts are of no doubt involved in the processes of identity construction of interest for this project, in order to maintain a sense of consistency and focus given certain logistical restraints, they will not be included at this time.

With foreign policy discourses defined as “analytical constructions—not empirical objects—through which the construction and linking of identity and policy can be studied...identified through the reading of texts, whether spoken or written,” they are a great starting block for the curiosity driving this study⁵³. Foreign policy is a realm of political decision-making where power can be seen in preventative, almost predictive, strategies, as well as in responsive measures. One needs to investigate foreign policy discourses in order to view how high ranking influential government officials from prime ministers to presidents distinguish their state from other political states, the ultimate Self from all Others. It is

⁵² Hansen, 73.

⁵³ Ibid., 51.

within foreign policy texts that political discourse is the most explicit regarding threats to state sovereignty and legitimacy, as it is within these texts that language is deployed in justification of government decisions and priorities from the national level down. In addition to the substantive importance of foreign policy discourses, as a researcher, they are easily accessible thanks to advances in internet archiving and official government databases. One can search texts using keywords and timeframes applicable to the project at hand, and consequently gain important organizational leverage and structure to aid in the following analyses.

While the decision to remain within the realm of official discourse makes sense from an organizational standpoint, it remains too general a framework from which to begin textual analysis and the methodological approach should be further refined. The key starting point for this study is the creation of new national legislation in both Britain and France that increases the government's power in order to combat terrorism. It is in essence, a public fight for legitimation involving both political and public spheres. Taking from these two starting points in 21st century legislative initiatives, it will then be necessary to "move "backwards" in time to sketch out the specific historical context, and finally come back "forward" in time" as a way to analytically capture the relationships taking form⁵⁴.

More specifically, within this "temporal back and forth" exists a strategy that requires the researcher to analyze the cultural resources actors use in a struggle for legitimacy, the histories of those resources, and the ways the actors deploy such resources during particular moments⁵⁵. To aid in such a mapping strategy of language analysis, focusing on "explicit

⁵⁴ Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. "Making Sense of Making Sense: Configurational Analysis and the Double Hermeneutic." in *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, eds. Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, September 2006, 271.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 269.

articulations”⁵⁶, an approach that begins by “identifying those terms that indicate a clear construction of the Other such as ‘evil,’ ‘dictator,’ ‘murderer,’ and ‘terrorist,’ or of the Self, such as ‘good,’ ‘civilized,’ ‘justified,’ and ‘attacked’”⁵⁷, will help specify patterns along the temporal timeline. Some terminology may be easily identified even before the texts are seriously scrutinized, such as “terrorism”, while others will most likely reveal themselves only through the process of discourse analysis.

In addition to the identification and notation of such particular terms, it is even more analytically intriguing to have a grasp of the ways in which such terms are presented and defined: *to have a priority on the contexts within which one finds such key terms*. Indeed, such a term as “terrorist” has been in usage for decades, but this does not mean that the intersubjective meaning it sparks when deployed in political rhetoric is the same now as it was in 1970. Such evolutions in linguistic terminology are central to this project’s intended analysis, and in order to gain some kind of greater understanding of how processes of identity construction are being molded by official discourses one needs to account not just for specific terms but for the constructed and planned contextual environment surrounding their use.

Looking at official reports, foreign policy speeches, and legislative documents, national security as influence on identity construction will chart its course. Whether through “speech acts” that do not just represent a situation but elicit responses⁵⁸, or in the written rules of a piece of legislation, language has a role in shaping the intersubjective knowledge of a government and people in the process of shaping their interpretations of world affairs. In referencing models of “rhetorical coercion”⁵⁹ and “representational force”⁶⁰ to empirically

⁵⁶ Hansen, 41.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 42.

⁵⁸ Onuf and Klink, 158.

⁵⁹ Krebs and Jackson, 35.

investigate national security discourses, language power presents a potential outlet for analysis to highlight both material sources of foreign policy initiatives as well as its relation to identity construction and the intersubjective knowledge grounding such social processes.

Some General Restrictions as a “Researcher”

In addition to the above discussions thematic literature and methodological design, it is essential to consciously recognize limitations on any research project due to the position of the individual or group performing such analysis. One says that a criteria to engage in a research study is that it “*should pose a question that is “important” in the real world*”⁶¹. While it is easy to see the logic and simplicity of such a concept, what is important is that “important” is a subjective term invariably based on the perceptions of the individual who first digests the question, then interprets, then finds a satisfactory response.

In the case of this thesis, while a specific question is not the driving force, an overall concern and corresponding curiosity regarding how current evolutions in national security and state struggles for legitimation intersects with identity construction in Western Europe has most definitely provided a personal catalyst for this topic: national security struggles have a potential to increase the state’s power to incredible levels, while exclusive conceptions of national identity have a potential to increase damaging social cleavages. In addition, there needs to be an awareness of the historical conditions motivating such conceptualizations, “a historical awareness of our present circumstance” as a researcher⁶².

⁶⁰ Bially Mattern.

⁶¹ Hansen, 5.

⁶² Foucault 1982, 778.

Living and learning in 2007, it is hard to not be aware of the themes basing this paper. Terrorism and its effects on language, power, and identity has overwhelming resonance due to its dominant place in media as well as its strong influence on political initiatives. It has been stated that “there is no discipline, no structure of knowledge, no institution or epistemology that can or has ever stood free of the various sociocultural, historical, political formations that give epochs their peculiar individuality,” and the realm of political science in American universities is no exception⁶³. With respect to international affairs and comparative politics in particular, there have and continue to be distinct influences on the researcher undertaking projects under the umbrella of the academic and professional environment permeating their perspective.

It is an interesting paradox presenting the student of international affairs in Washington, D.C. One is at once studying a very “academic” and theoretical discipline while living surrounded by the same discipline as the ultimate, “practical” profession. This experience confirms one conclusion of how such studies are theorized “not only from the influence of international events on the learning processes of a deterritorialized discipline, but also from the process being very much a product of national, academic culture”⁶⁴. While it may not be possible to empirically or logically present the effects of the researcher’s position as such, it is satisfying at least to have this environmental context be acknowledged in the process.

Academic pursuits in the American university system within political science present the student with requirements from courses looking into comparative political economy to

⁶³ Edward W. Said, “Representing the Colonized: Anthropology’s Interlocutors,” *Critical Inquiry* 15:2 (1989): 211.

⁶⁴ Ole Waever, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations,” *International Organization* 52:4, *International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*, (1998): 725.

quantitative methods. There is an overwhelming emphasis on the “practical” nature of international affairs while pushing a theoretical comprehension that are not always presented in a symbiotic way to aid the student in greater comprehension of world events. For example, while many neopositivist frames can perhaps generate pleasant, numerical or easily digestible outcomes for assignments, under deeper scrutiny they remain unsatisfactory in how “the actors under investigation are less active producers of their situation than passive consumers of it, and the scholarly researcher is not a creative interpreter of the situation so much as an accurate reflector of it”⁶⁵. This somewhat sugarcoated approach to understanding complex paradigms in political science, such as the relationship between national security discourses and identity construction, is to be consciously avoided.

One should also address how to handle such potential theoretical bents or influences on perspective during the analytical project. It is recommended that empirical analysis “should involve delineating the resources available and tracing the ways that they are deployed in practice, while sticking close enough to the data that statements about available resources have more of an empirical than a conceptual character,” providing one outlet for minimizing loose conclusions based on too many subjective ideals⁶⁶. This is not to say that theoretical convictions or methods should be ignored, just redeployed in a sense in order to maintain a certain “distance from the data”. Rather than avoid “values embedded in particular ideal-typical conceptual prosthetics,” scholars and students should “self-consciously exercise responsibility in selecting their analytical tools”⁶⁷. Therefore, the choice

⁶⁵ Jackson, “Making Sense of Making Sense,” 2006, 269.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 266.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 268.

of a discourse analysis methodology can join forces with a theoretical base in processes and language power to help sustain both empirical attention as well as theoretical responsibility.

Using discourse analysis as a methodology avoids being presented as a researcher with a surplus of images, mass media, or popular culture. Official discourses are an especially important choice as the only interpretation, and consequent space for misinterpretation of the texts, comes from the researcher. Where as policy briefs or scholarly reports are interpretations of interpretations with respect to the intentions of actual political elites, official speeches and legislation go almost as directly to the source as possible with respect to language and intention.

Weaknesses Connected to Textual Ethnography as Method

Whether due to the context of an IR classroom based in Washington, D.C. or personal biases to a particular philosophy, there are inevitable layers of interpretation that affect analytical conclusions in projects of this nature. Fortunately, studies of engaging in such research have presented various tools for the student interested in acknowledging their active role in project results while also engaging in serious analytical investigations.

It is necessary to identify potential limitations on the researcher's methods from the beginning of the empirical process in order to minimize the effects of such "activity". In this case, the use of a discourse analysis, representative of a certain textual ethnography, has a few specific patterns that are to be noted. First and foremost, one must consider the language involved, meaning what is the researcher's first language and what language is found in the texts of interest. Is there only one language to be interpreted? Is translation involved? How sufficient are the researcher's linguistic tools?

In the specific case of this project, there are two languages in use: English and French. While the researcher's native language is English, a Bachelor of Arts in French was earned in addition to time spent living and studying France. There is no doubt a higher proficiency in English, and consequently, this project comparing two states at the general analytic level is also comparing two linguistically distinct textual ethnographies. There are various ways to account for such a discrepancy in the methodological approach. For this project, one important decision is to investigate the original language documents in all possible instances. While the British documents are rarely in need of linguistic specifications, the French documents will undoubtedly require some sort of technical assistance from time to time in order to better clarify various vocabulary and grammatical context.

In addition to identifying this linguistic need of extra reference materials regarding one of the languages of this analysis, there is also the issue of translation to be acknowledged and planned for. Even though for the French case there will be a conscious effort made to locate texts in their original French language, there may arise a document from French government officials that has been translated into English. Overall, the researcher can minimize their active role when dealing with textual materials through an acknowledgement of language sources, capacity of the researcher to interpret such sources, intended audience of the textual authors, and in general a clarity of discourse collection and method.

CHAPTER 4

THE OFFICIAL DISCOURSES

In this study of how national security discourses surrounding counter terrorism measures contribute to identity construction in Britain and France, it is important to map out how the research will unfold. While it is strictly official discourses that have been chosen for this textual analysis, omitting any sources from media or popular culture for example, the *types* of official discourses to be analyzed have not yet been explicitly identified. Considering the various logistical limitations in a project such as this, text selection has had to be rather stringent.

That being said, in order to try and capture the spectrum of official discourses related to national security and at the very least draw attention to some extremes, this project has chosen to focus on legislative documents on the one hand, and speeches or reports authored by political elites with the intention of informing the public on the other. While the debates that occur “between” these two categories of official documents would perhaps provide a causal account of the relation between expanding government power through legislation and corresponding public-directed discourses, to demonstrate a causal relationship is not the intent of this project. Rather, this project hopes to provide a type of analytical mapping of how certain legal expansions of state level power are interpreted and then presented to the public through government officials.

The textual starting place begins with the most recent legislation passed by both states to fight terrorism. Legislative initiatives provide a nice starting point for this project’s

look into national security texts as they encompass one of the most accessible sources from which to understand changes in government power and capacity. Legal acts are often where changes in national security policy are seen most dramatically, resulting in changing amounts of legitimate authority in the hands of government officials and institutions. Unfortunately, despite the determinant nature of legal texts regarding authority, they are not especially helpful for someone searching for how their interpretations affect societal understandings of national security, identity, and so forth.

For this type of analytic understanding, we have to complement legislative texts with discourses from political officials in spheres outside of parliament where the goal of such speeches, reports, or documents is to interpret and consequently explain the intended intersubjective meaning of such legal shifts. With specific legal codes aiding in the investigation of speeches, reports and other documents of applicable context, the project's analytic process will hopefully become more fine-tuned with a smoother, more logical flow. Linguistic patterns and corresponding key terms combined with their contexts will be identified to help trace various commonplaces to gain a better grasp of evolving intersubjective meanings with respect to terrorism, terrorists, and how national security is intended to relate to concepts of identity in Britain and France.

As key rhetoric and actors are identified, it will be interesting and essential to consider the contexts in which they were used. In particular, it is important to make a research note of both the author(s) as well as their intended audience(s), as this may have an impact on the eventual intersubjective knowledge surrounding various commonplaces. After a discourse analysis of first Britain and then France using the above strategy, the project will

end with a comprehensive discussion of the linguistic patterns of national security counter-terrorism initiatives and unveiled processes of identity construction.

Case 1: Britain

The most recent act of British legislation to amend national security initiatives is the Terrorism Act 2006, with three other major acts of legislation relating to terrorism from the 21st century that are important to review: the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Terrorism Act 2000. Through a review of these four documents combined with relative speeches, debates, and reports stemming from government officials that incorporate “terrorist” rhetoric, the discourse analysis will hopefully evolve into a process exposing patterns of identity construction.

Terrorism Act 2000

It makes sense that the first piece of legislation to be referenced as a source for the meaning of “terrorism” in UK state activities be called the “Terrorism Act,” however, it cannot be said whether or not that definition will in fact be a useful, straightforward definition used as precedent. The introductory section states:

“In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where...the action falls within subsection (2) [serious violence against a person...serious damage to property...serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public...etc.]...the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause...”⁶⁸

⁶⁸ “Terrorism Act 2000,” [Internet]; available from <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00011--a.htm.1>.

The definition goes on to explain that if action involves the use of “firearms or explosives” then it can be defined as terrorism even if other subsections are not satisfied⁶⁹. This may already seem to be a very general means of explaining “terrorism” to officials. Interestingly, the vagueness continues to expand its potential through an identification of particular terms found within the above statement to explain government jurisdiction, for example stating that “ “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom...a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom”⁷⁰.

Thus far, while the Terrorism Act 2000 was the “first” of its kind, it does not seem very helpful with respect to illuminating the public of key components to government authority and legitimacy with regard to counter-terrorism policy. Going from “terrorist action” to “terrorist property” the act says “a person commits an offence if he...intends that it should be used, or has reasonable cause to suspect that it may be used, for the purposes of terrorism,” but never explains “reasonable cause”⁷¹.

When legislative language implements this kind of phrasing to set a precedent for interpreting activity as terrorist or not, it is worth particular mention and pause. To indicate an adjective such as “reasonable” in order to determine whether or not an action is an offense under this act is basically stating that the government has the power to subjectively determine whether or not an action is punishable under this act through a framework that clearly allows interpretation to come from sources outside the boundaries of this document’s language. Taking this general discussion of terrorist activity to the identification of those involved in such action takes us to “Part V Counter-Terrorist Powers”.

⁶⁹ “Terrorism Act 2000,” 1.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

This section of the Terrorism Act 2000 states that “terrorist” is not just someone committing offenses in previous sections of this legislation, but also someone who “is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism” that includes “a reference to a person who has been whether before or after the passing of this Act, concerned in the commission, etc.”⁷². There is no strong reference or mention of previous historical instances of terrorism to aid in the construction of the meaning of “terrorist” in this legislation, opening the field of potential “terrorists” to almost anyone depending on the government’s interpretation of “concerned”.

One would have expected more historical references, such as to IRA examples or at least some kind of way to distinguish this violence from other types of crimes against Britain’s national security. Consequently, the Terrorism Act 2000 is a measure that greatly increases state power and legitimacy in their capacity to combat terrorist activities. These powers have been contextually placed in such a way that any kind of definition to establish clear jurisdiction for the future is impossible except in the interpretations and actions of the government when the legislation is put into practice.

Another way the state retains expanded powers through the Terrorism Act 2000 is with respect to search and seizure. When a constable in uniform stops a pedestrian or vehicle, they may detain the individual “for such time as is reasonably required to permit the search to be carried out at or near the place where the person or vehicle is stopped”⁷³. What is “reasonably” in such a case? One hour? Three hours? This is the second explicit time through this discourse analysis that we see the deployment of “reasonable” or “reasonably” as adequate explanation for law enforcement and state prosecution officials to help

⁷² “Terrorism Act 2000,” 1.

⁷³ Ibid., 4.

distinguish offenses as terrorist related or not. Is there a conscious decision within this legislative document to set a precedent that declares “reasonable” as enough grounds to grant legitimate power to government officials charged with protecting British national security?

Looking into aspects of this act related to possession for terrorist purposes, “reasonable” pops up again in the language as the text says a person commits an offence if “he possesses an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism”⁷⁴. It would seem possible that the legislative actors are consciously setting up some kinds of matched distinctions for the sake of greater discrepancy in determining terrorist activities. Whether or not the state goes out to say that there is an effort to declare reasonable/unreasonable and state/terrorist as set in stone dichotomies for government actors involved in preventing and prosecuting terrorism, there is some kind of pattern beginning within this piece of legislation to aid in sustaining a new counter-terrorism rhetoric and struggle for government legitimacy.

Following this mention of possession for terrorist purposes, there is a clause regarding the collection of information that states a person commits an offence if “he collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism”⁷⁵. The phrase “of a kind likely” leaves much room for interpretation, with almost no end to the possibilities of where a person may be a risk for such an offence. Why does the text not say “reasonably likely”? More importantly,

⁷⁴ “Terrorism Act 2000,” 2.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 3.

do these emerging patterns of rhetorical power hold fast within future discourses and legislation, or do they give way to an evolution of new terminology?

Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001

With this major piece of legislation being passed in December of 2001, one wonders how much affect the attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington, if any, may have had in this government initiative. As the 2000 counter-terror legislation and various government discourses seemed oddly devoid of historical references to terrorist experiences the UK has had with the IRA and based their linguistic legitimacy more on a mention of community, the public, and national security in a general sense, will this abstract nature of national security discourses continue after 9/11? The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 begins with its statement of purpose:

“ “An Act to amend the Terrorism Act 2000; to make further provision about terrorism and security; to provide for the freezing of assets; to make provision about immigration and asylum; to amend or extend the criminal law and powers for preventing crime and enforcing that law; to make provision about the control of pathogens and toxins; to provide for the retention of communications data; to provide for the implementation of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union; and for connected purposes.” (14th December 2001).”⁷⁶

Within this legal debut, we see a somewhat disconnected approach to specific aspects relating to national security. As the discussion continues, there are explicit linguistic efforts to distinguish “nationals” and “residents” while also explaining issues pertaining to

⁷⁶ “Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,” [Internet]; available from <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/10024--a.htm>. 1.

immigration and asylum, and “race and religion,” issues that were not center stage in the 2000 legislation⁷⁷.

Perhaps most interesting in this project that hopes to better understand elements of identity construction through state-led counter-terrorism policy is the effort to define “national” and “resident”. The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 explains a national to be “a British citizen, a British Dependent Territories citizen, a British National (Overseas) or a British Overseas citizen,” where as a resident is said to be “an individual who is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom...a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, or...a Scottish partnership,” further specifying a resident outside of the UK to be “an individual who is ordinarily resident in such a country or territory, or...a body incorporated under the law of such a country or territory”⁷⁸. Interestingly however, there is no explicit mention of terrorism or terrorist activity, just a setting of the scene for future legislative initiatives so as to establish a loose categorical distinction among potential offenders. Is this identification made for strictly legal and bureaucratically necessary purposes, or is there another motivation behind such decisions?

“Terrorists” make their legal debut within this act’s section discussing the powers of the Secretary of State regarding “suspected international terrorists”⁷⁹. If the “Secretary of State reasonably...believes that the person’s presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national security, and...suspects that the person is a terrorist” then a certificate under the section of “suspected international terrorists” may be issued⁸⁰. Similar to the Terrorism Act 2000, the use of “reasonably” plays a key role in how this text decided to expand

⁷⁷ “Anti-Crime, Terrorism and Security Act 2001,” 1-2.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 2-3.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 1.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

government powers to the subjective realm of particular officials' opinion of whether or not someone is doing something "reasonable" or not in determining possible offenders. How has such terminology, "*reasonably*," based in such an ultimate subjectivity and open-ended potential for power bestowed upon various state officials and representatives, come to set a precedent for accepted government responsibility and leverage in control over the British public?

With an absence of clear material incentives or factual evidence of impending harm to British soil, one wonders what kind of persuasive mechanism is at work to convince other government elected officials and the public of such a legislative act's necessary purpose. Is it here that potentially the role of other discourses surrounding the British policy changes are of importance in this struggle for state legitimacy, perhaps pushing ideas such as British security, "our communities," "our country," democratic freedom, and other identifiers of the self as opposed to any kind of terrorist others?

Some insight into how British national security discourses use methods and tactics of identity construction to continue winning their battle for continued legitimacy in the fight against terrorism and consequent increases to state power can be seen in some official discourses that complement the passing of legislation during this period. In one major, public foreign policy speech on November 13, 2002, Jack Straw discussed the "Future of Foreign Policy" for the UK⁸¹. His opening remarks make a clear reference to September 11, stating that the examination of the future course of international relations has never been "so fashionable...since the attack on the World Trade Centre," but that to him September 11,

⁸¹ Jack Straw. November 13, 2002. "The Future of Foreign Policy," Lord Mayor's Lecture, London, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Speeches [Internet]: available from <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1037199035290>.

2001 was merely “the tragic confirmation of a trend in international affairs, which has been with us since the end of the Cold War,” where order was based on a “balance of terror”⁸². In starting his speech this way, he immediately invokes the most extreme vision of terrorism as the ultimate “Other” fighting against the “Self’s” existence as a large, modern, free, democratic state.

The language does not remain strictly within the British domestic sphere, however, and the international realm is invoked through both the 2001 legislation as well as this 2002 declaration of UK foreign policy priorities. The act broadens the terrorist space in declaring that “terrorist” means “a person who...is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism...is a member of or belongs to an international terrorist group...has links with an international terrorist group,” deploying *international* throughout the clause⁸³, while Jack Straw takes terrorism outside of the British Isles stating one of Britain’s major future priorities as “the threat to international security from terrorism”⁸⁴. How is this international aspect an important part to the state’s struggle for increasing power and legitimacy in the fight against terrorism? In invoking the international community, how do official discourses alter their discussions touching on identity construction? How is Britain both a part of some international identity as well as its own national self?

One way to further connect the international realm to domestic policy is through the presentation of specific hazards to a British way of life connected to terrorism through the concept of national security threats, but distinct from terrorism through their day to day

⁸² Straw, 1.

⁸³ “Anti-Crime, Terrorism and Security Act 2001,” 1.

⁸⁴ Straw, 3.

relevance for British communities. Straw explains how foreign and domestic agendas are “increasingly fused” since “drug production in Afghanistan and Colombia fuels crime on our streets” and “instability in any part of the world can bring asylum seekers to our shores”⁸⁵. This foreign policy discourse connects publicized terrorist havens, such as Afghanistan, with sources of domestic instability on British streets and in British communities.

Rather than lay out a specific agenda to combat terrorism, Straw said “let the terrorists be under no illusions...the slaughter of innocents in New York...was an attack on people of all nations and faiths. The world will maintain an implacable stand against this evil”⁸⁶. Similar to the Home Office report in 2005, it seems that this official discourse has a goal of sending a symbolic message to “terrorists” that the British government is not and will not back down. While the idea of a message directed to potential terrorists is intriguing, one should not ignore the inevitable effect on the general British public. In this dialogical example, we can also see the motive of the British government to demonstrate to its constituency that it is actively working to resolve potential threats to national security. Straw goes on to state a need for countries to ensure sensitive technology does not “fall into the hands of rogue regimes and terrorist groups,” for example through the UN that has “raised the bar against the illegitimate use of violence, by States and now by terrorists”⁸⁷. In so stating, terrorism is clearly outside the realm of legitimate behavior and deserves to be fought not only by the UK but by the international community whose views are in tune with Britain’s.

⁸⁵ Straw, 5.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 3.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 3-4.

Referencing Dean Acheson, Straw ends his speech with a powerful citation from Dean Acheson's "imaginative effort" to "eradicate the threats posed by terrorism"⁸⁸, among other security concerns, leaving the audience with a rather open-ended plea for a new government capacity in foreign policy that is farther reaching and more powerful in order to combat these new threats to the domestic and international spheres of British life.

Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005

The UK Home Office published a report entitled "Developing our approach to building a safe, just and tolerant society" in September of 2005, right before the October 12th passing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. After briefly highlighting various dropping crime rates, the report states "But as the public recognise, we need to do much more to address issues that are central concerns in our communities and country as a whole. And we need to respond to ever changing threats and opportunities. In short, we need to raise our game further."⁸⁹ This speech consciously mobilizes the public's support for policy changes before they even take place. In noting the "ever changing threats and opportunities" the UK Home Office is setting the stage for a government response that can at once increase state power and legitimacy while not explaining in detail to what it is responding since the threats are constantly shifting.

This "game raise" is explained to be a measure necessary for the government to be able to free up resources, with a "tighter focus on the measures that will make the greatest difference to the public and help build people's confidence"⁹⁰. Again, we see a focus not on

⁸⁸ Straw, 5.

⁸⁹ "Developing our approach to building a safe, just and tolerant society," UK Home Office. Published by Home Office Corporate Communications Unit, September 2005 [Internet]; available from 1.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 2.

state actors who will be charged with the management and deployment of those resources, rather, an explicit mention of the public and the “people’s confidence”. The language power expressed here is going after a tone that could be seen as rhetorical coercion: who would argue with a government initiative designed to build people’s confidence and protect the communities and country as a whole? Especially as this speech took place less than three months after the devastating July bombings in London. In fact the report does reference this attack, using them as evidence for new government power and policy through stating how the attacks “demonstrated not only the continuing danger of terrorism, but the critical need to address the issues we face through a combination of effective enforcement and community support and engagement”⁹¹.

About a month after this report, on October 12, 2005, the British Embassy in Washington, D.C. announced its passing of its new “Terrorism Bill”, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, and provided an official overview of its objectives along with comments by various officials on the Embassy’s website⁹². Through this official discourse, we can examine the victory stance by the British government in this new direction of state power. The very top of the document states “Home Secretary Clark’s proposed new laws to combat terrorism were published October 12. The measures in the Terrorism Bill will help tackle the terrorist threat facing the UK, including disrupting terrorist activities at all points in the chain.”⁹³ In the Embassy’s review of this bill’s proposals, each proposal begins with either “outlaw” “create” “extend”, or “widen”, making it very clear the bill’s overarching objective, to expand government powers in fighting terrorist activity.

⁹¹ “Developing our approach to building a safe, just and tolerant society,” 5.

⁹² “Defending Our Values Against Terrorism: UK Home Secretary Publishes New Legislation,” British Embassy, Washington, D.C., 12 October 2005 [Internet]; available from <http://www.britainusa.com>.

⁹³ Ibid.

Not only does the Embassy proudly display such increasing government power, but also discusses the desire of the Home Secretary to change the Immigration and Nationality Bill to strengthen UK ability to “deny asylum to terrorists” while also making it “easier to remove British citizenship from those whose presence in the UK is not conducive to the public good”⁹⁴. The discourse thus far in this official presentation of the effect passing the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 has had on the state position regarding national security is not only a proud expansion of power regarding counter-terrorism measures in particular, but also a proud statement of desire to continue increasing the state’s power in other realms of government such as immigration.

At the very beginning of this legislative document it states how the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 is:

“An Act to provide for the making against individuals involved in terrorism-related activity of orders imposing obligations on them for purposes connected with preventing or restricting their further involvement in such activity; to make provisions about appeals and other proceedings relating to such orders; and for connected purposes.” 11th March 2005⁹⁵.

Such an introduction of purpose and intention was both helpful and complicating. On the one hand, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 is largely based in previous counter-terror legislation, but on the other, major changes have been made to expand the scope of government power and legitimacy in ways that do not evolve in conjunction with “counter-terrorism” specific language.

⁹⁴ “Defending Our Values Against Terrorism...”

⁹⁵ “Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.” [Internet] Available from <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/50002--a.htm>, 1.

Under a new section regarding “control orders” it is stated that “The obligations that may be imposed by a control order made against an individual are any obligations that the Secretary of State or (as the case may be) the court considers necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that individual in terrorism-related activity,” a definition of jurisdiction both vague and expansive⁹⁶. In using phrases such as “any obligations” and “terrorism-related”, the act seems to be in pursuit of a generalized legitimacy for officials to follow. There is no identification of terms or historical precedent mentioned to help guide the reader. Instead, there is a continued lack of clarity combined with the conversely clear *preventive* intentions.

The explanation of “terrorist-related activities” in justifying government involvement was similarly unclear. While it makes an attempt to clarify the above phrase, saying that “For the purposes of this Act involvement in terrorism-related activity is any one or more of the following...commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism...conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so...conduct which gives encouragement...support or assistance,” this does little to tell either the public or state officials how to judge whether or not an action is “terror” related or not, reinforcing a sort of unhelpful indeterminacy of bureaucratic language⁹⁷.

It is worth taking a bit of a pause from the legal text to go into this “indeterminacy of bureaucratic language” a bit more. There is a consistent, yet unfortunate, habit of bureaucratic language to embrace a sort of unhelpful, repetitive, unclear existence. It rarely breaks its rhythmic mold devoid of any statements that provide a sort of stability of understanding, and yet this patterned absence of specificity remains the foundation for most

⁹⁶ “Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005,” 1.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

institutional guidance. It is with bureaucratic dialect such as this that the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 seems to base its continued legitimacy as a source of national security authority. Even in the realm of judicial oversight and accountability of executive officials, the legislative language in this act says that even if a court determines a decision from the Secretary of State to be flawed, all the court can do is “quash the order,” with no apparent penalty on the Secretary⁹⁸. Such a lack of personal accountability on this political elite cannot do much in the form of persuading official integrity remain intact through various investigative processes.

Perhaps such a lack of linguistic clarity in identifying national security threats and absence of any kind of line of command so to speak regarding state accountability may be found in a different type of official discourse, something sponsored by the British Defense Ministry. In referencing the “Defence Vision”⁹⁹ on the British Defence website, however, specifics are not deployed in its choice of language to reveal its view on terrorism any more than the 2005 legislation or the Home Office report. Rather, more general missions are portrayed stating the role of the Defence as being a “force for good in the world” basing future directions in “providing strategy that matches new threats and instabilities” and “strengthening our links with the Civil Departments to implement the government’s domestic agenda”¹⁰⁰. This mention of “new threats” hints at a discursive pattern similar to the “ever-changing threats” found in the UK Home Office Report of 2005¹⁰¹, but nothing more explicit than that acknowledgement of threat metamorphosis. It is hard to gauge what current national security threats are to the UK, and where any kind of stabilizing boundaries

⁹⁸“Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005,” 7.

⁹⁹ “The Defence Vision.” Defence, About Defence [Internet]. Available from <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 1-2.

¹⁰¹ “Defending Our Values Against Terrorism...”

may exist to help chart out a better analysis of the current threats the public and government should be most concerned with in continuing to analyze the 2005 legislative changes.

Going beyond the general searches for an explanation of threat and terrorism, with regard to the specific powers of arrest and detention, while one section states that the detention must be compatible with the subject's "right to liberty under Article 5 of the human Rights Convention," this is quickly followed by an "if, and only if" clause opening the door for various interpretations¹⁰². It seems quite apparent that the role of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 is to largely expand the powers of officials charged with fighting terrorist activities in order to provide greater security. Interestingly, it does not seem that in conjunction with a reinforced legitimacy of action for government officials to aid in the "prevention" of terrorism there are increasing roles for those responsible to keep such power in check, such as the courts.

To aid in the "general interpretation" there exists a statement at the end explaining "In this Act... "act" and "conduct" include omissions and statements... "acts of terrorism" includes anything constituting an action taken for the purposes of terrorism, within the meaning of the Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11)(see section 1(5) of that Act)... "apparatus" includes any equipment, machinery or device and any wire or cable... "article" and "information" include documents and other records," etc.¹⁰³. There does not seem to be any specification of terms, and the potential for "terrorist activity" could quite easily be described as endless based on this act's language. How does such unending power for the state evolve into legitimate, legal coding? What forces and intersubjective understandings

¹⁰² "Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005," 12.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 27.

among politicians and the public were convincing enough to allow such an invasive, unclear act to pass?

Going back to the UK Home Office Report from September of 2005 to perhaps find some kind of foreshadowed struggle for legitimacy, interestingly, instead of finding terms related to “terror” for greater understanding of “terror” in legislation, there is an obvious absence of any such terminology. While drugs, alcohol, illegal immigration, and social problems are all mentioned, terrorism is not¹⁰⁴. The report puts terrorism in line with illegal migration, drugs, and organized crime, not as a threat similar to historical interactions with the IRA: it is a new security threat more in tune with various societal disturbances affecting British society. In light of how many official discourses surrounding the legislation focus strongly on the public and their needs and their confidence and their communities, it would make sense to incorporate trials and offences that citizens face day to day such as drugs, but it would also make sense to have an explicit discussion of “terrorism” as the pending legislation at the time is titled “Prevention of Terrorism 2005”.

The defining of actors and location is similarly vague both in the legislation as well as in speeches of the same historical context. Secretary Clarke is quoted as saying “the government is determined to do all it can to protect our citizens from groups who would try to destroy our society, our way of life and our freedoms,” and that UK law enforcement agencies are “operating in an environment where we must do all we can to protect our way of life from those who would try and destroy it through violence and fear”¹⁰⁵. While the “way of life” is undefined, it does not leave room for a lot of interpretation. Following from a discussion of making harsher immigration and asylum laws enabling the government to

¹⁰⁴ “Developing our approach to building a safe, just and tolerant society,” 7.

¹⁰⁵ “Defending Our Values Against Terrorism...,” 1.

change who among its citizens are British when national security beckons, one cannot help begin to think that whatever that “way of life” is, it must be separate from the immigrant communities who have such a potential for terrorists that laws need to be changed in order to provide for less stability of those citizens.

According to the Prevention of Terrorism 2005, the “public” is “the public in the whole or a part of the United Kingdom or the public in another country or territory, or any section of the public”¹⁰⁶. Not only does this act enlarge powers related to the particulars in identifying who is a “terrorist” with the potential to harm the state as opposed to previous legislation focused more explicitly on terrorism in relation to crime and delinquency or the IRA, but also where that identification may take place. Such increased government power over national security concerns is quite incredible, and the establishment of a vague, bureaucratically designed context without much concern for historical precedents or examples is equally impressive.

In looking at other, non-legal documents for better discursive understanding, it is revealed that since 1997 the British government has been reforming their counter-terrorism legislation. From the Terrorism Act 2000 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001, to the most recent Prevention of Terrorism 2005, the Embassy confidently expresses its government’s position as having the “toughest terrorism legislation in the world,” which is a vital and major step “in sending a clear message that Britain does not tolerate extremists and terrorist organizations”¹⁰⁷. This discourse seems not to be only for updating British officials and citizens of legislative updates, rather, for the international community as a whole to begin the sending of this message.

¹⁰⁶ “Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005,” 28.

¹⁰⁷ “Defending Our Values Against Terrorism...,” 1.

Interestingly, despite the “international” aspect of terrorism as stated in this report, there is not much mention of collaboration at the international level with other governments. While the report states that “dealing with extremism and preventing terrorism are top priorities for the UK, and the EU as a whole,” that “no single country can tackle terrorism alone,” the UK’s history of counter-terrorism legislation remains largely in the national sphere¹⁰⁸. Was there any kind of precedent in previous legislation and speeches to spark such current domestic focus and international ambiguity? Perhaps a larger internal focus provides quicker legitimacy for increasing government powers in conjunction with the almost impossible to rebut idea protecting the British nation, the British identity.

Terrorism Act 2006

The most recent piece of legislation that passed British parliament incorporates incredibly unique, new measures into previous national security strategies involving terrorist offences. One of the most evident expansions regarding a unique legislative initiative is the incorporation of the “*Encouragement etc. of terrorism*” as a national security offense¹⁰⁹. In the first part of the Terrorism Act 2006, often cited as the most controversial, encouragement of terrorism applies to

“a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences”¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁸ “Defending Our Values Against Terrorism...,” 2.

¹⁰⁹ “Terrorism Act 2006.” [Internet]. Available from <http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk>, 1.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

This is not only extremely broad as a legal definition, but it is also dependent upon an offence that has yet to actually occur, further complicating the already abstract nature. Consequently, any reader or interpreter of the law is presented with an interesting paradox of understanding that oscillates between a seemingly intentional vagueness on the one hand, and a reference to an explicit sort of security threat on the other.

One element with the potential to encourage terrorism in the spirit of this 2006 legislation is the “dissemination of terrorist publications”¹¹¹. While the “dissemination” aspect is defined similarly to the more general encouragement of terrorism, a publication is said to be a “terrorist publication” if “matter contained in it is likely to be understood, by some or all of the persons to whom it is or may become available as a consequence of that conduct, as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”¹¹². Again we see a use of a scripted, all-inclusive rhetoric that uses concepts such as “direct or indirect” and “commission, preparation or instigation” to ground its foundation from which to gain interpretive understanding. How does such encompassing legislation come to be passed in an open democratic society where independent judiciaries and citizen rights should be playing a role in conjunction with elite political decision-making?

Also worth noting in this Terrorism Act 2006 is how previous legislation is referenced to establish a kind of consistent vocabulary into positions of rhetorical commonplaces. Rather than reference counter-terrorism legislation from the 20th century that focuses on the well-known experiences in Britain dealing with the terrorism of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), this Terrorism 2006 Act explicitly tells the reader to look at the

¹¹¹ “Terrorism Act 2006,” 2.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 2-3.

Terrorism Act 2000 in order to clarify such meanings as “acts of terrorism”¹¹³. It is as if the legislative designers are making a conscious effort to re-design the meaning of “terrorism” within a 21st century context of national security threats and terrorist activities. This re-designing seems to be occurring in a way that says to the public, “on the one hand it is inappropriate to use counter-terrorism language from the days of the IRA, but if you’re in need of explicitly detailed definitions for this new terrorist commonplace, you’re out of luck”.

To have national security discourses with these kind of unlimited terms and phrases is in itself an interesting result of decisions of political elites and other officials in determining a government course of action, but of even more interest is the way such discourse patterns continue in multiple sets of legislation. This 2006 act is not the first legal initiative by the British government in its fight against terrorism, but the fourth major legislative shift in the past seven years. Why has the language of national security remained rather elusive and nondescript rather than evolve in specificity over time? Instead of narrowing in on potential targets and refining the security rhetoric, Britain has maintained a sort of vagueness in terminology regarding terrorism and national security offenses to continue a type of open-ended potential for changing counter-terrorism legislation.

Other Non-Legislative Texts from 2005 and 2006

From the discourses evaluated there has been surprisingly little in regard to historical events, leaders, or other notable memories of the past to illuminate current discussions of national security, except for various references to September 11, 2001. It seems that this

¹¹³ “Terrorism Act 2006,” 13.

century has brought with it both new national security threats and a new method of explaining them to achieve a kind of common language when discussing government initiatives that invokes a 21st century international community with 21st century terrorist threats. On May 10, 2006, Attorney General Lord Goldsmith gave a speech at RUSI called “UK Terrorism in an International Context”¹¹⁴. In this rather long address, he began by exclaiming the international character of this fight against terrorism that it “is an international problem...a particular challenge for democracies who must strive to protect individual liberties while at the same time ensuring collective security”¹¹⁵. Interestingly, it is an international problem from which government authorities are motivated to design *domestic* counter-terrorism policy. Ideals of a “collective security” are rhetorically placed within a national British context promoting the British democratic way of life. At once it seems national security initiatives have a goal of recognizing a certain international community while maintaining a distinct British identity in need of special protection.

This 21st century international collective identity is further defined as that of “the western world,” with Goldsmith referencing September 11th saying that it “provided evidence of the ability of the terrorists to strike at the heart of the western world,” continuing to cite the recent examples of the Madrid train bombing in 2004 and the London attacks of July 2005¹¹⁶. It seems that September 11th was a catalyst for much counter-terrorism discussion in the UK, and continues to play an important role as the ultimate symbol of the terrorist threat. This is a bit of a surprise as an American student. One expects

¹¹⁴ Goldsmith, Lord. “Attorney General Lord Goldsmith: UK Terrorism Legislation in an International Context.” Royal United Services Institute, London, May 10, 2006 [Internet]. Available from http://www.britainusa.com/sections/articles_show_nt.asp?d=0&ci=41072&L1=41012&L2=41012&a=41824&pv=1.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

United States foreign policy officials and national security rhetoric to focus on September 11th in its efforts at beefing up domestic strategies such as the Patriot Act, but for a European state that has experienced 21st century terrorism on its own soil.

Interestingly, while Goldsmith takes a short moment to state how “terrorism is not a new phenomenon,” referencing actions of the IRA (Northern Ireland), ETA (Basque areas of Spain and France), and even the Black September attack on the Munich Olympics in 1972, he seems to cite such examples only to make the current threat more distinct as “September 11th changed the landscape of terrorism forever”¹¹⁷. This incessant attention to September 11th is quite ironic as it would be easy to assume that British counter-terrorism initiatives would be prepped for terrorist activity due to its proximity to terrorism as a threat to national security from the IRA. It seems that this is not at all the case, and instead, official discourses are using September 11th as a catalyst for new terminology and commonplaces surrounding terrorism and national security.

Goldsmith presents this changing landscape as evidence of this post-September 11 terrorism as “of a different nature from older forms of terrorism and therefore more difficult to tackle”¹¹⁸. Stating how the “primary responsibility” to protect the citizens “in any democratic state falls on the government,” he reinforces the necessity for state power in order to maintain Britain’s democratic identity¹¹⁹. This democratic nature is further propelled into such a search for government legitimacy through its linguistic transition into a discussion of the British “way of life,” how “it is essential to preserve our democratic way of life...the very liberties and values which the terrorists seek to destroy”¹²⁰. Highlighting British

¹¹⁷ Goldsmith, 1.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 2.

liberties and values inherent to their democratic way of life, this discourse presents a form of rhetorical coercion that would strongly disable any opposition to the particular policy aims stemming from such an identity-based proclamation. How could anyone argue with a goal of democratic liberty and freedom, and that if terrorists are looking to destroy such goals, well, they are certainly not a part of the British self and should be dealt with accordingly by the state. Especially as it is the state who is responsible for protecting the indisputable, democratic way of life and “the individual rights we all hold so dear”¹²¹.

This speech’s mention of the controversial nature surrounding the passing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 is quickly brushed by, followed by a passionate discussion of the Terrorism Act 2006’s great potential and sincere purpose¹²². This act proposes to criminalize those “who publicly celebrate the acts of terrorism whilst claiming to reject violence themselves and refraining from directly inciting others to commit acts of terrorism”¹²³. This is an amazing shift in jurisdiction and applicable offenses that would allow the state to limit speech and expression by imposing fear of persecution for society even when acts of violence, or “acts” of terrorism in general, are not involved.

Such laws would provide for a legitimate government intervention and use of force at stages absent any actions that may cause damage to people or property. This discourse exclaims a need for the law to adapt so the police can intervene at an early stage in fighting new forms of terrorism, which was not the case with “Irish Republican terrorism where any loss of life was likely to be more limited and some form of warning could be anticipated”¹²⁴. As if to justify the legitimacy of new legislation that in essence allows for the government to

¹²¹ Goldsmith, 2.

¹²² Ibid., 3.

¹²³ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 5.

subjectively determine if various liberties are being used to prepare for potential terrorist activity before any action takes place, Goldsmith states that “we should not throw away our respect for the law,” that if Britain were “to abandon our commitment to the rule of law we would be giving the terrorists a victory”¹²⁵.

Consequently, this speech a few months after the passing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 seems not to demonstrate how the legislation has aided in increased protection for Britain, rather, it seems to be arguing for more legislative initiatives to allow for even greater government power in order to fight terrorism. In looking at another discourse, this one stemming from Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne on September 19, 2006, increasing justification for the rather unchecked government power to ensure national security is presented as necessary for Britain¹²⁶.

Similar to Jack Straw’s discussion of intrastate conflict in 2002, Browne references “lawless states” such as Afghanistan where again, the threats of drugs “were (and still are) delivered onto the streets of the West – as we know and remember all too well, particularly this time of year,” speaking of not only the threat such regions pose to the domestic life of British but also the connection between such threats and September 11th (“this time of year”)¹²⁷. While this speech does have to do much with Afghanistan in particular, there are hints at the broader security context in order to garner continued support for the mission as it is both a “noble cause” and “in our own national interest”¹²⁸. Even though there is no mention of the counter-terrorism legislation, there is a part of the discourse relating to

¹²⁵ Goldsmith, 5.

¹²⁶ Browne, Des. “Speech by Des Browne MP, Secretary of State for Defence, at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).” Defence, About Defence, RUSI Speech, September 19, 2006 [Internet]. Available from <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence>.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 1.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

whether or not the initiatives are legitimate in the sense of legal justification and its surrounding support or lack thereof.

Browne claims that those who disagree do so, “not because they question whether the mission is important, or indeed legitimate, but because they think it is impossible”¹²⁹! This may be an ultimate example of rhetorical coercion as explained by Jackson and Krebs. Browne is revealing a type of acceptance of the opposition to British policy rather than an attack of the opposition. His description of those who are not explicitly in favor of the mission as being against such measures because they view success as *impossible* instead of the means to success as *inappropriate* is in a sense, a way of stating that underneath all dissent of opinion from the government to the public, the truth of the matter is, everyone is on board for the purposes of counter-terrorism. There is no room left to argue as to argue would be to just voice the *inherent difficulty* of such a mission, not any kind of *misguided* ambition. Browne’s comment is also intriguing in how it establishes a certain “Other” opposed to the British state that is not the same kind of “other” as the “terrorist other”. Taking from this discourse, one can see how the struggle for legitimacy is engaging in a new type of “othering” from which state actors can acknowledge dissent without any question of their version of the true self.

To complement such previous, more defense or foreign policy oriented discourses we can look to the UK’s finance minister, Gordon Brown, and his speech October 10th, 2006 on “Meeting the Terrorist Challenge” from an economic perspective¹³⁰. In the beginning of his speech Brown reinforces the role national security plays in government decisions in stating that he and Tony Blair “have agreed for how our Comprehensive

¹²⁹ Browne, 2.

¹³⁰ Brown, Gordon. “Speech by UK finance Minister Gordon Brown on Meeting the Terrorist Challenge.” HM Treasury, Chatham House, October 10, 2006.

Spending Review will give priority to discharging what is the first task of government – the security and safety of the British people”¹³¹. Speaking of how “there should be no hiding place anywhere for those who finance terrorism,” in addition to the more general “no safe haven anywhere in the world for terrorists,” he is setting the stage to allow more government involvement in security initiatives relating to the terrorist threat¹³². It is how he describes this terrorist threat that is interesting, at once acknowledging the internationally-based spatial organization of terrorism while reinforcing the “first task of government,” the completely noble and sincere “security and safety of the British people”. Not the security and the safety necessarily of the democratic and free world, rather, the security and safety of the most important “Self” in the mix: Britain.

While he briefly recognizes historic examples stating how “In 1997 the terrorist threat to Britain focused on the IRA,” past notions of terrorism in the Isles does not present any further substance in explanation of British policy in 2006¹³³. With such a history of terrorist activity from the IRA on British soil, one would have expected more mention of those moments of national security scares in the government reinforcement of who is the Self, who are the Others, etc. Instead, the speech takes efforts to recognize the current terrorist threat as novel, whether that be to expand the sphere of the threat in how Al Qaeda is “the first terrorist organization with truly global ambitions,” or to focus the factual references on the events of July 7, 2005 “linked to Al Qaeda...appearing to involve home grown suicide bombers” instead of Britain’s IRA legacy¹³⁴. Thus, what we see after the 2005 legislation in rhetoric from the financial sector of government is an increasing effort to

¹³¹ Brown, 1.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

distinguish the current terrorist challenge from previous issues of national security, despite using similar language. No longer do discourses invoke images of Belfast or the IRA, but images of the threatening other as Islamic fundamentalists reminiscent of September 11th and its consequent, sensationalized reporting. Whether or not this means that IRA is less of an other to Britain than Al Qaeda cannot be judged, however, there is clearly a shift in the political discourse to alter public perceptions of the terrorist other.

Brown says explicitly in his address that these are “new threats for whom there is no precedent,” where government are unavoidably “forced to consider every means, every necessary resource – all methods of diplomacy, all means of intelligence, all tools of law, policing and our security and military forces – in order to discharge our first duty: to protect our citizens”¹³⁵. Again we see reference a “first” duty and responsibility of the British government to establish a type of linguistic power that cannot be questioned as it is of course of the sincerest political nature. While the use of national security as a justification for government policy that may otherwise be considered rather controversial is nothing new, the positioning of traditional national security rhetoric, such as citizen protection from enemies, along with a familiar term “terrorist” that has been given a new commonplace position, is an intriguing evolution of language in official discourses of Britain.

Instead of creating a entirely new vocabulary to deal with legislative changes aimed at creating more power for government and state personnel, it seems that the British state is drawing on familiar terms but placing them in more dramatic, extreme, *contemporary* contexts that continue pushing a British self while changing the invoked, threatening other to fit such new context. Gordon Brown continues this path of intensity saying that while “Of course all

¹³⁵ Brown, 2.

the great challenges of today's new global society – from global economic competition to climate change – are important, but upon meeting and overcoming this challenge of global terrorism all else we value depends..."¹³⁶ It seems that such an open ended idea of terrorism as the ultimate threat to any kind of understood British way of life is pulling considerable weight. Not only has the government passed four major counter-terrorism initiatives in parliament since the beginning of this century, but they are also continuing to push a new rhetoric through a nonstop struggle for legitimacy even when specific policy initiatives are not clearly "on the table" in need of explicit support.

How can critics match statements by government officials entrusted to protect the state that base their conviction on phrases such as "the new terrorist threat – multi-continental in its reach, multi-dimensional in its operation – has changed the rules of the game – and so changed how we need to protect ourselves against it"¹³⁷? This kind of language is incredibly intense and dramatic portraying rhetorical coercion at one of its finest hours, this linguistic claim of changing rules of the game and a need for new protection gaining acceptance before even approaching a persuasive since there is no possibility for a sustainable rebuttal¹³⁸. Is this Britain's new weapon of choice to control its state operations and maintain sovereignty in an era of European integration and a globalized economy?

In fact, Brown himself points to such a possibility! He confidently states how "It is difficult for opponents to say that the changed terrorist threat is not serious enough to justify change in our laws...to minimise the severity of the changes in the world around us to justify

¹³⁶ Brown, 2.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 5.

¹³⁸ Krebs, Ronald and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric." *European Journal of International Relation* 13:1 (2007): 35-66.

the status quo is a disappointing failure of leadership,¹³⁹ hardly shying away from the possibility that his speech is in itself acting as a coercive mechanism: it is just coercion for the good of the people. Before anyone may even have a chance to digest such charges, he highlights to the audience the seriousness of the current terrorist threat by stating that Al Qaeda's threat began before September 11th, as the Twin Tower attacks were being planned as "United States was taking action with Europe to protect Muslims in the former Yugoslavia, and was leading the most concerted drive in decades for peace in the Middle East"¹⁴⁰.

In again mentioning September 11th as well as a Euro-American cooperation aimed at looking out for Muslim communities, the speech takes a new twist in its efforts at drawing battle lines along the terrorist fight. Even though the west is framed in a context of helping Muslim communities, the context also reinforces their distinction as two different global communities. He says that "this is not a clash of civilisations nor of cultures"¹⁴¹, attempting to bridge potential rifts of disconnect, but also indicates that in the larger debate revolving around diversity and integration "all who live in this country should learn English, understand our history and culture, take citizenship tests and citizenship ceremonies...and history education in all our schools give young people a basic understanding of the values and traditions of what it is to be British."¹⁴². There is a conscious effort in the discourse to establish a cultural distinction between "terrorists" and "British" along a path that distinguishes a Muslim realm and a non-Muslim realm, among other societal distinctions.

¹³⁹ Brown, 6.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 9.

¹⁴² Ibid., 8.

Invoking images from a different historical time and societal disconnect is the speech's deployment of Cold War rhetoric for additional justification of the current British "offensive". Brown reminds the audience how "from 1945 the united front against Soviet communism involved not only deterrence through large arsenals of weapons, but a cultural effort on an extraordinary scale"¹⁴³. While he does not go on to mention particular controversies surrounding that effort at the time, he does continue the cultural stance in stating that "it is only by standing up for our values, by winning the battle for ideas, by showing the values of liberty, democracy, and justice are the best ways of respecting the dignity of all individuals that we will prevent the indoctrination of future generations of terrorists"¹⁴⁴. In using phrases such as "our values" the speech continues along a path of boundary delineation without adequate gray area from which perhaps those "future generations of terrorists" may feel comfortable being a part of.

Reinforcing the potential for such a forced boundary on this discourse's interpretation, the finale contains an ultimate gamut of references to a large divide of "us" and "them". His conviction with respect to a type of chronological and culturally hierarchical grouping of teams rings loud in concluding "So just as we did in the last century, and just as we did after September 11th when America and Europe stood shoulder to shoulder, America and Europe need to come together to agree yet again that our shared values are the common ground on which we build -- and that together we must work with all countries, all continents and all faiths of the world to isolate terrorist extremists and prevent the

¹⁴³ Brown., 7.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 9.

indoctrination of a new generation of terrorists.”¹⁴⁵ While the citation is long to say the least, its details are illuminating and important to pick apart.

His historical reference establishes the roots of pertinent ideological groups (America and Europe against communism), peaking in a recent symbolic catastrophe (September 11th), speaking of “shared values,” and then at the end, adding the rest of the global community to the fight against terrorism. Interestingly, at the end, rather than continue to build up a potential international coalition fighting against opposing values, the discourse reverts to the role of the British state “Our priority as a government: a Britain strong in security, robust in our resolve, resilient in any response, so that as a nation we both defeat terrorism and isolate violent extremism wherever we confront it and whatever its source.”¹⁴⁶ Both focused on the nation and Britain while leaving the specifics of the threat vague and open-ended, Brown successfully completes his deployment of a coercive rhetoric in favor of intensifying the state government’s role in this battle.

Some Concluding Thoughts Regarding Britain’s Rhetorical Strategy

After this brief investigation into 21st century legislative initiatives by the British government as well as corresponding official discourses from various actors in other settings than Parliament, it can be confidently stated that British state power is expanding and on the move. Legislative initiatives have been made to increase legitimate state authority with respect to preventing terrorist threats to national security through greater overall jurisdiction, law enforcement resources, and future expansionary potential to go beyond current

¹⁴⁵ Brown, 9.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 10.

strategies. These transitions have been made with little or no substantial opposition from either the public or those in official government positions.

In acceptance of these government initiatives to strengthen their role in the name of national security, the struggle for legitimacy sparks a strong curiosity to better understand how these steps with material and ideational consequences on British society came to pass. While it was expected to see this struggle base its argument in historical references to previous British experiences with terrorism such as with the IRA, the textual analysis provided a rather shocking outcome. There were only a handful of times in the sources of this project where officials referenced IRA activity in their contexts surrounding a justification for the increase in British state power.

Interestingly, there were substantial deployments in the rhetoric of “September 11th” commonplaces where context demanded specific examples. Terrorism and the corresponding “terrorist other” in British official discourses seems to be evolving into a contemporary image and political representation that departs from any pre 9/11 ideas of terrorism to encompass a new terminology from which to base intersubjective understandings of the terrorist threat. Additionally, there was a large effort to incorporate a certain collective “us” that spanned the international sphere through its incorporation of the “west” and “democracy” that while, on the one hand pointed to a need for some kind of international institutional mechanism, would always revert linguistically into a call for greater domestic capability.

This focus on the national sources of protection for the British self seems to be a simultaneous reinforcement of both the need for a strong British government apparatus as well as a strengthening of such a state identity. Through mechanisms of rhetorical coercion

stemming from the highest levels of British government, the language power seen in this discourse analysis seems to be deployed not with a foundation in historical events of the IRA, rather, with a ideational base focused on the British national identity and state existence that in order to exist requires the utmost state responsibility for its protection, and consequently, new measures from which to combat terrorism from legal codes to military programs. Such surprising twists in the textual analysis of British documents concerning a legitimization struggle in light of increasing government power to fight terrorism sparks rather intense curiosity to investigate how the French state has dealt with similar issues this century.

Case 2: France

The French state has an extensive penal code used against most sources of criminal activity. Consequently, to analyze the French government's authority on combating terrorism, we need to investigate the major institutional structure as well as more recent developments in rhetoric pushing government involvement from national initiatives such as Vigipirate, to more regional initiatives such as the redeployment of military resources on the domestic front.

A Government Overview

As written on the French embassy's Washington, D.C. website, France's history with terrorism began domestically in the mid-1980s as "France was racked by terrorist acts, with bombs exploding in public areas such as cinemas, shopping centers, stores, offices, and

police stations”¹⁴⁷. Regarding the 1990s, the website references how the “world’s most famous landmark,” the Eiffel Tower, was “the suspected target of airplane hijackers on July 25, 1995...fortunately thwarted by France’s special antiterrorist forces,” as well as Paris’s “four month barrage of attacks attributed to an extremist Algerian group” in 1995 where nail- and bolt-filled explosives killed 8 and injured 130¹⁴⁸. This rather dramatic and forceful confirmation of France’s experience with terrorism seems to be taking the direction that while there is perhaps a new generation of terrorist threats, as a state France was a victim from before September 11th or any other 21st century events against other European states.

Not only does the embassy direct attention to domestic experiences with terrorism, but also France’s experience in locations other than France itself, thereby highlighting the global nature of the terrorist threat while maintaining a state-level focus in official discourses. First referencing the October 1983 attack on both U.S. marine as well as French barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 58 French and 241 Americans, the text goes on to mention the 2002 suicide bomber attack killing 11 French naval engineers in Karachi, Pakistan¹⁴⁹. In sum after recounting these major events “France has incorporated the need for combating terrorism at the highest levels of its government policy.”¹⁵⁰ Interestingly, the “incorporated” aspect of French policy seems to be most focused on the Plan Vigipirate, a strategic approach to state authority largely already in place, rather than the creation of one new legislative bill after another as seen in the British case.

Vigipirate’s mission is to aid in the mobilization of police and armed forces within legal powers already in place to ensure the protection and security of the French during

¹⁴⁷ “France’s Experiences with – and Methods Combating – Terrorism,” <http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/terrorism.asp>, 1.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

times of terrorist threats. While Vigipirate was created in 1978, it was updated in 1995 as well as 2000. As a plan to deal with terrorist activities, it takes “protective measures that are deemed necessary, including the reinforcement of surveillance and security measures in train stations, airports, and other places where there are large amounts of people,” and can be described as a set of measures organized on a four-level scheme similar to the U.S. Homeland Security Department’s in that levels of enforcement are arranged by color¹⁵¹. While the embassy text takes time to further expand on Vigipirate, distinguishing its “simple” and “renforcé” versions, showing that when the latter is in place “customs plays a more assertive role in ensuring better security, both police forces and the army are present at high-traffic public areas and the entrances and exits of major buildings are heavily monitored,” there is no mention of other specific, new policy initiatives France is currently taking to combat terrorism¹⁵².

This text put in place to inform various international audiences of France’s strategy in counter-terrorism ends with a statement of France as similar to the U.S. and no “stranger to terrorist acts,” stating “France has long been determined to prevent future terrorist acts”¹⁵³. From this one can assume the French government’s dependence on historical examples to explain current involvement in national security measures across their country, however, no specific discussion of new policy measures except for Vigipirate was presented to guide those interested in understanding more about 21st century French counter-terrorism strategies.

¹⁵¹ “France’s Experience With – And Methods Combating – Terrorism,” 1.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

Le Plan Vigipirate

In referencing the official government page explaining Vigipirate and the details of each of the four color-coded levels of alert¹⁵⁴, a better understanding of how the French government is deploying its power in the name of national security and fighting terrorism can be achieved. The very creation of such an alert system is symbolic of the direction government authority continues to display to both its domestic constituents as well as the international community. Through the designing and implementation of the Plan Vigipirate, the government has demonstrated that a need exists for the French state to have such a plan in the first place. Additionally, through a reform of Vigipirate in both 1995 and 2000, the French state has engaged in a transparent process of changes to Vigipirate that reinforces the continued need for and *existence of* this counter-terrorism policy.

While the plan says that each color level depicts a series of measures for which the government can obtain a determined objective, it is hard to discern any “determined” objective as each level entails a single small paragraph with general terminology¹⁵⁵. For example, at the *niveau rouge*, the third highest level, the description of appropriate government measures says that in order to prevent one or more “attentats graves [serious attacks]” they will put in place various means to protect institutions that are “en acceptant les contraintes imposées a l’activité sociale et économique [accepting the constraints imposed on social and economic activity]”¹⁵⁶. What does “constraints” actually entail? In a struggle for legitimacy in the face of the French public, it is interesting that the plan does not go out of its way to provide any kind of substantial, detailed description of what potential effects such

¹⁵⁴ “Plan Vigipirate.” [Internet]. Available from http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/information/fiches_52/plan_vigipirate_50932.html.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 1.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 1.

government power may have on society. The lack of any kind of identified limit to government response seems to indicate there is no limit except to keep changing the label for whatever action is taken by going on to the next level. The actual decision of the government announcing its raising of the alert level on the Plan Vigipirate would seem to be a process in and of itself disregarding the details of that process, simultaneously legitimizing the plan itself while increasing government authority over public rights and activity.

For the highest level, “contraintes” from the *niveau rouge* evolve into “des mesures particulièrement contraignantes [measures particularly constraining]”¹⁵⁷. The language remains vague, but presents itself in an even more dramatic context than previous levels. Of course there is some discretion and accountability in determining what level of alert would be announced, with the initial use of an undefined set of “services spécialisés” to determine a synthesized report of the current situation, however, the ultimate decision of alert announcement based on Vigipirate organization depends on the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister¹⁵⁸.

This gives extensive power to the heads of state in determining to what level the terrorist threat poses on the state, and consequently, the level of acceptable authority for the government to maintain over economics, society, military, and politics. In fact, in the newest version of Vigipirate from 2000, the website proudly states how this newest version “permet une plus grande souplesse et une meilleure réactivité des actions de l’État [permits a larger [permits a larger resource base and a better reactivity of state actions]” in order to combat increasing and changing terrorist threats¹⁵⁹. In exclaiming the positive result of higher

¹⁵⁷ “Plan Vigipirate,” 1.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

reactive capability by the state through such reforms, the French state implies a need for greater resources to combat terrorism, which one would logically associate with a greater threat from the terrorist other. Without going into detailed identification of threat potential, sources, or historical examples, the process of such a plan in conjunction with a discourse that is full of excitement and content over the resulting power from the process would seem to indicate that national security is in need of such new measures.

In addition to the new authority given to government by these alerts, the plan also draws on explicit citizen involvement in order for Vigipirate to be as effective as it the government promises, similar to how some of the British discourses drew upon the public, the community, and their overall role in national security initiatives by the government. The citizen involvement is needed to allow for “le partage et la diffusion d’une culture de sécurité [the sharing and spread of a culture of security],” as Vigipirate’s success rests in large part on a dependence of French citizens since “chacun doit prendre en compte les risques, du simple citoyen aux services chargés d’intervenir contre le terrorisme. La vigilance doit être entretenue et les équipes de sécurité sont formées et entraînées [each must take account of the risks, from the simple citizen to the services responsible to intervene against terrorism...vigilance must be among everyone and security teams are formed and trained, ready to go]”¹⁶⁰.

Through an incorporation of French citizens, this counter-terror text provides the opportunity for each French person to choose if they are in fact a part of the French “Self,” or if they are in fact a potential part of the terrorist “Other”. Through the establishment of such public “battle lines,” the French state has successfully deployed a type of rhetorical coercion from which to establish legitimacy in its current policy objectives.

¹⁶⁰ “Plan Vigipirate,” 1.

There is no specific mention of previous attacks or strategies in the measures allotted to the state in times of threat level announcement or change, and similarly, there is no mention of specific officials or government teams able to make decisions on Vigipirate except for the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. With this 2000 initiative a vague synopsis of what legitimate government authority regarding terrorism may entail, perhaps looking into the French legislative penal code itself for mentions of terrorism will shed increasing light on the relationship between terrorism, government power and national state identity.

In order to better situate oneself in the context of discourses surrounding a redeployment of government resources and authority with respect to ensuring French national security, a general understanding of how “terrorism” has recently played out in the French penal code is helpful.

November 2001 – “La Securite Quotidienne”

In November of 2001, some distinct changes and additions were made to the penal code with respect to day-to-day security [*la securité quotidienne*] in France. Referencing the January 21, 1995 description of security, the law restates security to be a *droit fondamental* [fundamental right], and a condition of the exercise of both liberty as well as a reduction of inequality¹⁶¹. Based on this title, security is said to be first and foremost “un devoir pour l’Etat [a duty for the state to uphold]”, reinforcing the role of the French national government as the party responsible to look after the territory of the Republic, the protection of its people, their well being and rights as citizens, the defense of their

¹⁶¹ “LOI n 2001-1062 du 15 novembre 2001 relative a la securité quotidienne. NOR: INTX0100032L.” November 15 2001. *Legifrance*, [Internet]. Available from <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/>, 1.

institutions and national interests, and maintenance of peace and public order¹⁶². This is not surprising and mirrors much of the official British discourses with respect to government duty and responsibility with respect to protecting the state. Also worth noting is the linguistic decision to position security as a *daily* right for citizens and responsibility of the government, rather than focusing on rarer occurrences such as actual terrorist attacks.

Reading on in this law regarding daily security, terrorism is mentioned explicitly in chapter five, titled “dispositions renforçant la lutte contre le terrorisme [arrangements/measures to reinforce the fight/struggle against terrorism]”¹⁶³. Under this chapter heading, the law states that in order to deploy *des moyens impérieusement nécessaires* [methods urgently necessary] in the fight against terrorism, increasingly fed by drug and arms trafficking leaning on information and communication technology, the arrangements under this law will be adopted until December 31, 2003¹⁶⁴. The Parliament will be asked by the government before that date for their evaluation of the application of these methods¹⁶⁵.

Arranging terrorism in a context that also incorporates the offenses of drug and arms trafficking is reminiscent of the British legal discussion. Through an establishment of setting that includes terrorism with domestically disturbing issues such as drugs that many citizens are already aware of, the state is able to broaden its scope of legitimacy in counter-terror measures to include more “relevant” issues affecting French society right now. If both Britain and France are associating terrorism with illegal drugs for example, is this a new linguistic strategy from which national governments are hoping to create a certain self/other dynamic that on the one hand places terrorists in an extremely vague although existing

¹⁶² “LOI n 2001-1062...,” 8.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

league of their own, while including them with domestic offenders that are already a type of other in French political discourse?

The law goes on to specify that officers of the judiciary and police can, in the places and period of time determined by *le magistrat*, stop and search vehicles under terrorism suspicions if in public places¹⁶⁶. This measure greatly increases the power of government authorities at the local level to enforce counter-terrorism legislation within their own individual discretion, thereby both increasing government power while legitimizing its changing policy through the introduction of its necessity for security, no matter what the civic infringement may entail.

This legal code of 2001 then goes on to specify the financial elements surrounding terror threats where government powers can be increased. It is said in article 421 that to finance a terrorist enterprise through supplying, collecting, or managing funds, knowing that they are destined to be used either wholly or partly for acts of terrorism “constitue également un acte de terrorisme [equally constitutes an act of terrorism]”¹⁶⁷. This addition to include any kind of financial involvement with the intention of contributing to a terrorist organization takes the legal jurisdiction for French government intervention to a new, expanded level, similar to changes in the British legal strategies of the 21st century. In addition, these funds can then either be confiscated whatever their nature, or at the very least, the judge of the liberty and detention can, under the request by the Attorney General of the Republic, order conservative/administrative measures against the property of the person under examination¹⁶⁸. The *juge des libertes et de la detention* [judge of liberty and

¹⁶⁶ “LOI n 2001-1062...,” 9.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

detention] has their powers again reinforced by the document's end statement of how this judge is in charge of the national territory with respect to the application of all arrangements from this law¹⁶⁹. If the French government penal code is expanding both the powers of the judiciary and the powers of the executive (Prime Minister and President) towards the same goal of fighting terrorism, one wonders where the democratic idea of oversight and accountability can be found. With the citizenry also "called to duty" as seen in the Plan Vigipirate, it seems the French state is making no effort to hide its overriding goal of establishing a very dedicated, responsible "us" to combat whatever potential "them" may arise.

Finally, this 2001 shift in the French penal code makes reference to an international agreement made in New York on January 10, 2000. Regarding the international convention for the repression of terrorist financing agreements, those convention objectives can and should be met through use of the arrangements made in this adjusted legislative document¹⁷⁰. As can be seen through this mention of international agreement along with more explicit references to the financial elements of terrorism, the French penal code was adjusted in 2001 to allow for greater opportunity of government involvement in the struggle for national security in light of the new dimensions of terrorist activity. For a more in depth look at particular officials, we can jump ahead just over a year to the May 2002 legal adjustments made with regard to the Minister of the Interior, of Interior Security, and of Local Freedoms.

¹⁶⁹ "LOI n 2001-1062..," 15.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 16.

May 2002 – “Attributions du Ministre de l’Interieur...”

In this legal transformation of May 2002 we see a reinforced authority with respect to counter-terrorism initiatives given to the Interior Minister in particular. The minister is in charge of all questions concerning the territorial administration of the State with respect to interior security, public freedoms, and local collectivities¹⁷¹. More specifically, it is written that in order to exercise those responsibilities, the minister has authority over the general direction of the administration, local collectivities, national police, public and judicial affairs, defense and civil security, financial affairs, among other services including the general inspection of the administration¹⁷². This seems to be a sweeping inclusion of many aspects of government reach within national boundaries bestowed upon the authority of the Interior Minister in light of national security concerns. Additionally, the very existence and modification of such a posting as “Interior Minister” reinforces the need for a specifically domestic executor of state power, even if the threats justifying the minister’s existence are simultaneously defined as global or international in scope.

The Minister of the Interior is also responsible to work with the Minister of Defense to determine the conditions of accomplishment and modes of organisation with respect to the judicial police¹⁷³. Here we see an official discourse that reinforces the spatial dimension of the national state as the key actor in preventing terrorist activity on French soil or against French citizens abroad. Through a reinforcement of this national authority and duty, there is

¹⁷¹ “Décrets, arrêtés, circulaires, Textes généraux, Ministère de l’intérieur, de la sécurité intérieure et des libertés locales: Décret n 2002-889 du 15 mai 2002 relatif aux attributions du ministre de l’intérieur, de la sécurité intérieure et des libertés locales. NOR: INTX0200080D.” May 15 2002. *Legifrance*, [Internet]. Available from <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/>.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

equally a reinforcement of the French national identity as “real” enough to legitimize the material resources and cultural identity of such political appointments.

March 2003 – “Pour la Securite Interieure”

In this penal code adjustment of 2003, it is important to first note the title of the legislative initiative: “Dispositions Relatives aux Forces de Sécurité Interieure et à la Protection des Personnes et des Biens [Arrangements Relative to Forces of Interior Security and the Protection of People and Property]”¹⁷⁴. One of the most notable elements stemming from this title is the reaffirmation of changes made in the 2001 law relative to the *daily* security of persons in the French penal code.

This 2003 version states that the result of the Attorney General’s research regarding acts of terrorism as defined in the penal code and previous jurisdiction extensions given in light of such acts, those increased powers will continue in effect past the initially stated deadline of December 2003 (see discussion of November 2001 penal code adjustments)¹⁷⁵. Specifically referenced in this affirmation of previous legal enhancements were the powers of the judicial police and the magistrate regarding the stop and search of vehicles as well as the renewable option to detain someone under investigation for at least 24 hours¹⁷⁶. In reinforcing the need for government to have legitimacy in such enforcement proceedings along with a reaffirmation of security as a *daily* right, such legislative discourse in the process of its formation and articulation affirms the legitimacy of the terrorist threat.

¹⁷⁴ “LOI n 2003-239 du 18 mars 2003 pour la securite interieure. NOR: INTX0200145L.” March 18 2003. *Legifrance*, [Internet]. Available from <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/>, 1.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

In Chapter VII of this 2003 version of the penal code, titled the same as Chapter V of the 2001 version “Dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme,” reaffirms the 2001 description of terrorist activities justifying enhanced government intervention in various counter-terrorism arenas. Specifically, the declaration of the need to continue to deploy *des moyens impérieusement nécessaires* [methods urgently necessary] in the fight against terrorism, increasingly fed by drug and arms trafficking leaning on information and communication technology, is extended through the December 2003 endpoint another two years to December of 2005, when Parliament will again be asked by the government to evaluate the continue use of these methods¹⁷⁷.

Consequently, while nothing explicit was added in this 2003 amendment to the penal code, the government did, in conjunction with the Attorney General, extend the use of the 2001 initiatives put in place with respect to an increasing terrorist threat, consequently *extending* their viability in light of any potential criticism from political or public opposition. Again, rhetorical coercion rears its linguistic head. Interestingly, this particular example sparks the question of whether or not repetition of particular commonplaces or elements of rhetorical coercion have the same level of power as when they were first introduced as a context from which to gauge government legitimacy. As this law passed renewal without challenge, signs would seem to indicate that in fact, rhetorical coercion need not evolve over time to remain strong, rather, such mechanisms of government control can maintain their intensity through repetition alone without any new contextual evidence per se.

In extending these articles and their interpretive effects through both official government arenas as well as in the public domain, the French state has reinforced both the

¹⁷⁷ “LOI n 2003-239...,” 15.

terrorist threat as well as the legitimate need for continued expanded, government authority. This continuation of power is legally justified even when in those years from November 2001 to March 2003 there were no deadly or publicized terrorist acts on French soil. If this trend of a lack of what could be called apparent material threats continues, will the French state continue to expand its potential for power and authority over its democratic citizenry?

November 2003 – “A la Maitrise de l’Immigration...”

The next most accessible legal shift that may have influence in the construction of French identity and establishment of various “others” investigated through government website activity revealed itself to be that of a law with respect to immigration, foreigners, and nationality. While terrorism was not overly apparent in titles and headings, it is explicitly mentioned in various articles and pieces of the document. For example, with respect to deportation and measures of expulsion, one of the exceptions to such government action was with respect to “des activités a caractère terroriste [activities with terrorist character],” which was quite pointedly separated from other interests “fondamentaux de l’Etat [fundamental to the State]”¹⁷⁸. What determines whether or not an activity has a “terrorist character” or not? In British discourse there was a deployment of “reasonable” as a means for officials to interpret potential offenders and threats, where as here in the French wording, there is merely the explicit conviction that a terrorist other embodies a specific, identifiable “terrorist character” to watch out for.

This makes an interesting and new distinction of terrorist from fundamental interests of the state. Why would the legal code make this kind of separation? Such a separation is

¹⁷⁸ “LOI n 2003-1119 du 26 novembre 2003 relative a la maitrise de l’immigration, au sejour des etrangers en France et a la nationalite. NOR: INTX0300040L.” November 26 2003. *Legifrance*, [Internet]. Available from <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/>, 14.

made again further down in the code in stating that the overall arrangements of the present act are not applicable to some fundamental interests of the nation as seen in previous legislation, nor to acts of terrorism as previously stated¹⁷⁹. What is of interest here are not the particulars relating to the above stated “fundamental interests of the nation” or “terrorist activities,” rather, the fact that the two are separated again in such a drastic, legal context, and the power that such a context can display.

March 2004 – “La Crime Organisée et la Délinquance”

One of the most recent legal changes in the French penal code that drew specifically on terrorism was found, not too surprisingly, within the borders of organized crime and societal delinquency. Under a chapter heading incorporating a struggle against economic, financial, customs, terrorist, public health, and maritime pollution, the legal code was modified to include “participer au financement du terrorisme [to participate in the financing of terrorism]” as an offense¹⁸⁰. This trend to include the financial element of terrorist activity under the umbrella of organized crime and delinquency is similar to the earlier 2001 legislation and the efforts made to associate terrorism with drug and arms trafficking rather than keep it as an isolated phenomenon. Fifteen pages later with regards to more offenses, again the language was adjusted to include “financement du terrorisme [financing of terrorism]” in addition to other qualifications incriminating organized crime activity¹⁸¹. Consequently, what we see from 2001 to 2004 in French penal code shifts is the gradual

¹⁷⁹ “LOI n 2003-1119...”, 31.

¹⁸⁰ “LOI 2004-204, du 9 mars, la crime organisée et la délinquance.” March 9 2004. *Legifrance*, [Internet]. Available from <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/>, 45.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 60.

inclusion and extension of the way language as well as material powers can incorporate “terrorism” into official discourses.

Whether through responsibilities of the Interior Minister, authority regarding immigration and nationality categories, or even elements of delinquency “terrorism” as a rhetorical tool has filtered into the detailed and extensive legislative code, ever evolving into a more present threat to French national security in need of handling. While it is clear that various ministry officials and law enforcement have been bestowed expanded authority in this fight against terrorism reinforcing French identity of the self as connected to state political officials, investigating where the military fits in will provide a nice comparison to the previous look into a bit of Britain’s Defence Ministry.

The French Military Approach

One especially interesting public document from French military sources is the 2003-2008 Military Programme Bill of Law [MPBL]¹⁸². This extensive official document highlights many defense reforms in the French system that touch on the above discussed legislative reforms from earlier on in the 21st century related to counter-terrorism objectives of the French state.

Cited as beginning largely in 1996 by the President of the Republic, military reform has been renovated to “ensure the security of the French people and defend our interests better by affirming our strategic autonomy and giving France a driving role again in Europe and thereby in the world, by participating effectively in operations to establish and maintain the peace,” a rather vague and all-encompassing objective, ranging from autonomous to

¹⁸² “2003 – 2008 MILITARY PROGRAMME BILL OF LAW.” [Internet]. Available from <http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/mindefa.pdf>.

multi-lateral initiatives and national to international spheres of influence¹⁸³. Intending to preserve both “freedom of assessment and choice” while diversifying its “capacity to act within coalitions,” the French military is indeed under expansive shifts in authority and responsibility¹⁸⁴. Authority expansion as seen in legislative discussions is also supported in this defense text as the Gendarmerie forces, a sort of quasi-military/police force, is now placed under the power of the Minister of the Interior while conserving its “organic attachment to the Defence ministry,” expanding the reach of a defense oriented force while at the same time expanding the responsibility and power of the Minister of the Interior, a part of the state-level executive¹⁸⁵. This is of important mention as it is the second time an official government policy decision has acted in a way to explicitly connect military and defense with interior issues. Through a pairing of military and interior, one resulting interpretation is that the interior institution of protection, such as local level police, is not adequate in this historic moment to fight against new threats such as terrorism.

Perhaps of even more interest is what follows under the heading “Understanding our Defence and Security Environment”. It is under this heading that we see the explicit deployment of “terrorist” rhetoric in explaining the new defence mission of France. The Bill highlights how it is “against all expectations” that crises and conflicts have continued in the world “creating fragmented, multiple and often asymmetrical threats, which are exercised by state or non-state entities,” with terrorism as one type of asymmetrical threat joining forces with other threats such as “organized criminal activities or schemes as numerous as they are varied”¹⁸⁶. This is quite a statement with respect to how encompassing it is, relying on a

¹⁸³ “2003-2008 MPBL,” 1.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 1-2.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 2.

definition of threat that is both general enough to allow for preventative measures to be justified, and specific enough to substantiate a realistic harm.

Taking this theory of a linguistically enhanced “realistic harm” to the next section of the military law entitled “Threats Concerning French People directly” is especially fitting¹⁸⁷. While the beginning of this document may have utilized an abstract tone, the elements under this heading are much more explicit. Perhaps most stimulating as far as a detailed description of threats affecting the defense renovation and precipitating a new term in military vocabulary at the domestic level is the reference to September 11. Those attacks, as seen through the scale of violence and number of victims, have in the words of this military document “sanctioned the emergence of mass terrorism”¹⁸⁸.

This new concept of “mass terrorism” is further enhanced by a description of such a threat as opening the door to new types of conflicts “without battlefields and without clearly defined armies, where the enemy, ready to use weapons of mass destruction, clearly aims at civilian populations,” with France as vulnerable to these types of threats due to its existence as a “highly developed open society with a high level of technology”¹⁸⁹. Such a synopsis triggers the concept of rhetorical coercion yet again, as who could sustain any kind of rebuttal that would go against the French “open society” that is so treasured but that in so being demands protection over its “civilian populations”? Without an explicit identification of any threatening “other” at this stage of the text, there is a clear “self” in how the language presents no acceptable alternative: whoever would be outside of the “acceptable” discussion would most certainly encompass some type of “other”.

¹⁸⁷ “2003-2008 MPBL,” 2.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

After this establishment of France as such a developed and open society, drawing the boundary around its modern sense of self to separate from other regions and societies without going into details, the document begins a discussion of the very nature of geographic borders. Stating how the “*distinction between internal and international terrorism is becoming blurred*” we see in this security language the opening of a new spatial frame of reference for the audience¹⁹⁰. One may conclude from this that if one had an initial concept of what “terrorism” was, the current idea of “terrorism” is in flux and evolving into a new form, almost literally presenting a blurred image or haze in previous intersubjective understandings.

Terrorist cells and networks are said to be found both “abroad but also in western countries,” with financing from sources such as organized crime and a motivation stemming from a “deeply felt hostility towards the West”¹⁹¹. This is extremely interesting as it draws on the earlier stated spatial shifts in understanding terrorism before going into a more specific boundary creation between “the West” and “western countries” and “abroad”. The discourse makes such a blatant distinction without going into any specific details of what it means or “who” exactly is a part of “what” categories, relying on some kind of intersubjectively understood meaning of “west” while attempting to create a *new* meaning for “terrorism”.

Taking this boundary yet another step in the discourse, the text explains how terrorist groups “exploit the frustrations of certain sections of the population, frustrations based on regional crises – historic, economic or social - , as well as the difficulties encountered by certain elements of the immigrant communities to become integrated into

¹⁹⁰ “2003 – 2008 MPBL,” 2.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

our countries,” reinforcing societal boundary structures and potentially disruptive cleavages already of issue in French social and political realms¹⁹². In a state such as France where immigration has been reinvigorated as a political hot topic recently, this kind of statement in discussing the main duty of government as to provide security while also highlighting immigrant communities in such a way as to establish their “otherness”, there is a certain kind of discriminating identity construction in process that simultaneously is increasing government legitimacy and power.

The discourse continues this “blurring” rhetoric in establishing a new level of danger to the terrorist threat stating how the “shrinkage of distance, the opening of borders, and the development of terrorism into a kind of war, all contribute to a blurring of the line between internal and external security”¹⁹³. This is a rather incredible step in the language patterns of this defense discussion. Instead of keeping terrorism within a context focused on other elements of social violence and societal disruption such as organized crime or delinquency, the language defines terrorism as a “kind of war” through which to increase legitimacy for the military’s role in conjunction with other state ministries and resources. In reinforcement of military personnel and duty, there is a reinforcement of the patriotic, undeniable existence of a distinct national, French self in need of protection and support.

Ironically, after all the discussion surrounding a blurring of boundaries in this new threat of terrorism, the text takes a moment to focus in on the “transitional societies at the borders of Europe” since it is in those delineated regions that the French Defense anticipates tension and instability which will “continue to be reflected in violent identity-

¹⁹² “2003 – 2008 MPBL,” 2.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

searching reactions, coloured by nationalism or religious fundamentalism”¹⁹⁴. On the one hand it seems that threats are not able to be geographically identified, and on the other hand, there is a specific area of potential danger garnering significant defense attention. There is a tension here between an identification of the “other” as some abstract criminal, and the identification of the “other” as rooted in particular geographical and historical contexts. With Europe declared as the “main political and geographic focus,” this discourse refers to the “European and transatlantic circles of unity,” reinforcing earlier distinctions between the West and “abroad” in another linguistic pattern implying an “us” and “them” type dichotomy¹⁹⁵.

With prevention stated as “a permanent necessity against the reappearance of large direct or indirect threats, the development of crisis situations or of conflicts liable to involve our security and interests and those of our partners in the EU and the Atlantic Alliance,” the language is then able to narrow in on the terrorist threat in explaining that the way to achieve “prevention” in this realm is through an inter-ministerial coordination of analyses and actions, hinting at the legislative adjustments seen in 21st century penal code shifts¹⁹⁶. To argue with an objective of presenting terrorist activity and the consequent violence or harm it could bring on French citizens and soil would be interpreted as almost ludicrous, and consequently, one cannot help but interpret such discourse as yet another example of language power and rhetorical coercion for the government to win its struggle for legitimacy.

Expanding on this preventative strategy is the Bill’s focus on “protection”. It states that the “emergence of diverse threats (terrorism, proliferation, trafficking and major

¹⁹⁴ “2003 – 2008 MPLB,” 2-3.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

criminality) gives protection a renewed meaning,” that protection in this new arena is “a matter of being able to wage war at any time against blackmail, reprisals or aggression against the territory or the population”¹⁹⁷. Again we see the use of the word “war” in discussing the fight against terrorism, and a consequent escalation of its potential as a threat against French interests. Going from “war” to “inter-ministerial coordination”, the discourse proudly presents the Gendarmerie as a military security force that, thanks to its new placement under the Ministry of the Interior for domestic missions “reinforces the protection of individuals, institutions and territory and coordinates State resources better,” contributing to “the State’s continued response to threats to domestic and defence security”¹⁹⁸. This draws on the conviction of this military document while highlighting the expanded power as seen in legislative shifts through the reference to the Ministry of the Interior.

With the Minister of the Interior garnering more authority through changes to the French penal code as well as the addition of substantial material resources such as the Gendarmerie, one can see the mutually reinforcing aspect of material and ideational factors contributing to an enhanced state legitimacy and power.

January 2000 – Chirac and the Diplomatic Corps

Taking this opportunity to reference the symbolic nature of speaking at the beginning of January 2000, Chirac explains that “pour les Européens” the notion of the year 2000 is clear, and that history obliges “us [Europeans]” to consider the past¹⁹⁹. He then states

¹⁹⁷ “2003 – 2008 MPBL,” 8.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Chirac, Jacques M. “Discours de M. Jacques Chirac Président de la République lors de la présentation des vœux du corps diplomatiques (Palais de l’Elysee),” January 4 2000, [Internet]. Available from http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/discours_et_declarations/2000/janvier/discours

proudly that despite the past experiences with extreme nationalisms and two world wars, for fifty years Europeans have succeeded in creating the conditions for a new European renaissance, and that due to its foundation on freedom and democracy war between people of the European Union is impossible²⁰⁰.

This speech from the President of the Republic to his diplomatic corps regarding current security demands draws on interesting correlations between what should be aimed for to promote security in Europe and language seen in future texts responding to what terrorists aim to destroy. For example, in discussing the conflict of Kosovo and Montenegro, Chirac says that “la clé d’une solution durable pour l’ensemble de la région demeure l’avenement d’un regime démocratique à Belgrade [the key to a durable solution for the region lives in the creation of a democratic regime in Belgrade]”²⁰¹. While there is no explicit mention of terrorism here, there is a distinction made between the secure, democratic “us” and the insecure nature of a region without an established democracy.

Stemming from Chirac’s push for democracy in Kosovo and Montenegro, the discourse continues to present the President’s wishes for “une société internationale marquée par le progrès constant des droits de l’Homme et de la démocratie et l’émergence d’une conscience universelle [an international society marked by constant progress with respect to human rights, democracy, and the emergence of a universal conscience]”²⁰². Again, while terrorism is not directly invoked in the language of this speech from the French president, there is an interesting pattern of language consciously grouping particular societies and governments while isolating others that is worth noting in the overall analysis of security

[_du_president_de_la_republique_lors_de_la_presentation_des_voeux_du_corps_diplomatique.99.html](#).
January 4 2000, 1.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 1.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 2.

²⁰² Ibid., 4.

discourses in France and corresponding establishment of the French self as opposed to the other.

September 2001 – Chirac and 9/11

In response to the events of September 11th in New York and Washington, Chirac stated to his audience that “C’est en effet avec une immense emotion que la France vient d’apprendre ces attentats monstreux – il n’y a pas d’autre mot – qui viennent de frapper les Etats-Unis d’Amerique. [It is with immense emotion that France comes to hear of these monstrous attacks – there is no other possible word – that came to the United States of America.”²⁰³ Clearly flustered with the deployment of “monster” in his expression of sorrow, the leader of the French Republic goes on to exclaim his total support for President George W. Bush during these times, reaffirming the French identity as associated with America, consequently reinforcing a type of collective Western, democratic team²⁰⁴. Interestingly, this is where Chirac’s discussion of the day’s events trails off and instead, he takes this opportunity to remind France of its history with terrorism and the corresponding duty of the French government to maintain a sense of security.

In leaving his audience away from Paris and his desk, Chirac concludes the discourse with a statement to his citizens how “La France a, vous le savez, toujours condamne et condamné sans reserve le terrorisme et considere qu’il faut lutter contre le terrorisme par tous les moyens. [France has, as you know, always condemned and condemns without

²⁰³ Chirac, Jacques M. “Intervention de M. Jacques CHIRAC de la Republique a la suite des attentats ayant frappe les Etats-Unis.” [Internet]. Available from http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/discours_et_declarations/2001/septembre/intervention_de_m_jacques_chirac_president_de_la_republique_a_la_suite_des_attentats_ayant_frappe_les_etats-unis.1357.html. Faculte des metiers, Ker Lann, Rennes (Ille et Vilaine), Mardi 11 septembre 2001 Faculte des metiers, Ker Lann, Rennes (Ille et Vilaine), Mardi 11 septembre 2001.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

reservation terrorism and considers that you must fight against terrorism by all means necessary]” and that for this reason, he requests that the audience excuse his early departure but is obligated to return immediately to Paris²⁰⁵. It is as if within this official discourse, Chirac has decided to engage in a type of reinforcement of his responsibility and legitimate place as protector of the French state since clearly, there is still a terrorist threat to be combated.

September 2001 – Government Response

Another influential discourse from September of 2001 came from Lionel Jospin, who explained his “emotion profonde, de l’horreur aussi pour cette violence inacceptable, des pensées d’emotion a l’egard des victimes, de leurs familles, et l’expression d’une solidarité profonde a l’egard du peuple americain [profound emotion, of horror for this unacceptable violence, emotional thoughts with respect to the victims, their families, and an expression of one solidarity profound with respect to the American people]”²⁰⁶. As seen in the way Chirac seized the opportunity of September 11 to reinforce the French state’s legitimate need for counter-terror measures in light of such global threats, how the French government handled their Plan Vigipirate in response to September 11 is also quite revealing.

It states that along with the support and advice of the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister of Defense, and Minister of the Interior and Transports, the president confirmed in a televised statement that “les mesures de precaution qui s’imposent ont été prises immediatement par le Gouvernement et le plan Vigipirate, que vous connaissez, est mis en oeuvre [the measures of precaution necessary were immediately taken by the

²⁰⁵ Chirac, “Intervention...a la suite des attentats...,”1.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

Government and the Plan Vigipirate, that you know well, is put into effect]”²⁰⁷.

Consequently, even though there was no terrorist activity on French soil under specific French government authority, September 11th provided the necessary context from which to put into place the reformed Plan Vigipirate, and in so doing, reaffirm its validity and legitimacy for French security.

In thinking of effects on identity construction from various national security initiatives, it is interesting to note another government response seen through official documents involving a meeting of various societal groups. On September 13, the Minister of the Interior and policy forces met with representatives from the Jewish community and the Islamic community to explain the measures undertaken by French government officials in response to the terrorist attacks and to reaffirm the place of Islam in French society, distinguishing it from violent fundamentalist versions²⁰⁸. This is interesting because on the one hand it seems a deployment of state power to reinforce the inclusion of the Muslim community as a part of the French self, but at the same time in identifying this societal group as separate from the mainstream in and of itself seems to be a process of boundary construction and acknowledgement of categorical difference. Not just difference with respect to societal boundaries, but a difference that has the potential to be directly linked to terrorist activity whether it occurs directly against the French or not.

Directly after this meeting of representatives, on September 14th, there was a meeting between officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Ministry of Defense to discuss the impressive mobilization of gendarmerie and military units thanks to

²⁰⁷ Chirac, “Intervention...a la suite des attentats...,”1.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 1-2.

the Plan Vigipirate, in particular in region surrounding Paris²⁰⁹. This meeting is another public affirmation of the need for Plan Vigipirate, and consequently, the need for a state-led authority to protect the French self from terrorist others. The discussion of Vigipirate in particular as a response to September 11th was not the only moment of the French state's deployment of language power in the name of national security.

On September 19th "Lionel Jospin reaffirme sa solidarité avec les Etats-Unis, évoque la coopération internationale dans la lutte contre le terrorisme et appelle les prefets a la vigilance [Lionel Jospin reaffirms his solidarity with the United States, pleading for international cooperation in this fight against terrorism and calling everyone to be vigilant]"²¹⁰. In so stating, Jospin, as an official representative of the French state, at once restates the existence of a certain international "us" fighting this insane global threat, but does so without any kind of tangible or explicit initiative to establish an international "game plan". Instead, the absence of such international strategy aids in the French government's fight for its continued relevance and legitimacy without having to look as though it is not a part of some "good, democratic, international, collective identity". While the effect of a linguistic evolution such as this is not necessarily damaging, it does reinforce the existence of a particular national self in need of continued attention by those in political power.

In addition during September of 2001, there existed a reunion of various ministers where these officials announced that the project of law regarding *daily security* (seen in the initial 2001 legal analysis of this project) will be "complete pour tenir compte des vulnerabilites nouvelles a la menace terroriste que revele la situation actuelle [complete in

²⁰⁹ "Les attentats de New York et de Washington du 11 septembre 2001 et la mise en oeuvre du plan Vigipirate renforce." [Internet]. Available from http://www.vie-publique.fr/documents-vp/chrono_vigipirate.shtml, 1.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 2.

order to handle new vulnerabilities from the terrorist menace that have been revealed in this actual situation” underlining the new, unpredictable terrorist menace opened up by the attacks of September 11²¹¹. Here we see a final discursive conclusion to previous linguistic strategies that includes the justification of shifts in French legal documents and consequently, includes the justification for increasing government authority with respect to national security initiatives.

October 2001 – Speech at the UN

On October 1st, 2001, Jean-David Levitte, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, presented France’s response to the UN commitment to combating terrorism as an international body. He said that on September 11 “all of them [people of France] felt American, reacting with an instinctive solidarity with a friendly people and ally with whom they felt and shared the trauma...also because they realized that if America could be struck at the heart of its power, the whole world was threatened²¹². Continuing on this trajectory of expressing how France understood the events of September 11th, he references Jacques Chirac in saying that the French solidarity with America “reaffirmed the unfailing determination of France, a country that has many times been victim of acts of terrorism, to take part in the war against this scourge,” and that it is the “combat” of the entire international community²¹³.

²¹¹ “Les attentats de New York et de Washington...,” 2.

²¹² Levitte, Jean-David. “56eme session de l’Assemblee generale, Point 166 de l’ordre du jour, Mesures visant a eliminer le terrorisme international: Intervention prononcee par S.E.M. Jean-David Levitte, Ambassadeur, Representant permanent de la France aupres des Nations Unies, New York, le 1er Octobre 2001,” [Internet]. Available from http://www.un.int/france/documents_francais/011001_ag_france_desarmement.htm, 1.

²¹³ Ibid.

While perhaps the French felt American and the international community as represented by the UN felt like a type of collective identity, there is clearly a use of such contextual opportunity to also reaffirm the existence of national selves. Even while terrorism is an international issue to be combat by the international community, when material resources and decisions are investigated, it is dominated by domestic initiatives. One wonders if terrorism did not exist as such a global, real, dangerous threat, would there be such a need for the types of government power seen through the discourses thus far of this project?

June 2003 – G8 Summit

After the G8 summit in Evian, France, one official statement reported that the international community “has been united in fighting against international terrorism since the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001,” but that the threat “remains serious”²¹⁴. It then goes on to affirm one of the most important aspects of a counter-terrorism strategy “to categorically deny terrorists a safe haven anywhere,” leading to the G8 goal for “the G8 to have a common plan for counter-terrorism outreach activities and capacity-building assistance with a view to ensuring that assistance by the G8 be selectively and effectively provided to those areas in which countries need assistance most”²¹⁵. While an international “common plan” never developed in this official discourse, having mentioned its potential as a type of collective, group effort, French officials establish their solidarity with the international community fighting terrorist others while remaining distinct enough to

²¹⁴ “Evian G8 Summit, June 1 – June 3, 2003.” Evian, June 2, 2003 [Internet]. Available from http://www.ambafranceus.org/news/statmnts/2003/g8summit_terrorism060203.asp, 1.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 1-2.

justify various domestic security initiatives in the future, reinforcing the French national, unique existence.

In an ordering of priorities the report lists objectives as “to deny terrorists the means to commit terrorist acts...to deny terrorists a safe haven and ensure that terrorists are prosecuted and/or extradited...to overcome vulnerability to terrorism (for example, to enhance domestic security measures and capability for crisis management and consequence management),” highlighting the type of objectives that France as an independent state has already been focused on as seen in its legislative adjustments and reinforcement of domestic security forces²¹⁶. Not only does the report list the above objectives that inherently increase state level powers while in a process of international cooperation, but it says that those measures should be seen as “complementary to initiatives to strengthen good governance, the rule of law, human rights and judicial reform, and to the analysis of factors which contribute to the emergence of terrorism”²¹⁷. In a new type of rhetorical coercion, the language presents counter-terrorism as in line with the most basic and uncontroversial aspects of government responsibility such as the rule of law and human rights.

This addition at the end of such a detailed, strategic overview of recommended G8 objectives in counter-terrorism is insightful as it reinforces the position of domestic restructuring of resources and institutions in the fight against terrorism as superior to any kind of more bottom-up level or international approach to the threat of terrorism. Rather than use the G8 community as a forum to create international institutions or groups as teams against terror, the G8 seems to have been used as a way to publicly reinforce measures taken

²¹⁶ “Evian G8 Summit...,” 1-2.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

that greatly increase states' powers in the fight against terrorism, consequently trumping state identity and existence over any kind of international self.

June 2003 – Sarkozy and National Police Reforms

Nicolas Sarkozy took the opportunity of key speaker at a National Police Force event to promote state authority and noble responsibility in light of national security demands of the 21st century. Reaffirming the existence of the national police as one of the most necessary and respectable aspects of 21st century reality, Sarkozy tells the new officers that “Vous portez maintenant l'écharpe tricolore et l'épée des commissaires. Je lis dans vos regards, comme dans celui de vos familles, la fierté de porter ces symboles de l'autorité de l'Etat. Votre fierté et votre joie sont légitimes et méritées. [You now wear the three color flag and sword of the commissaries. I read in your regards, as in those of your families, the pride to wear such symbols of State authority. Your pride and your joy are legitimate and merited.]”²¹⁸.

This commending speech for dedicating one's life to the pursuits of a national material power such as the police is an affirmation of the state's existence as distinct and superior from any kind of collective identity. Sarkozy goes on to say that “je sais que votre choix d'être commissaire repose sur une conviction profonde: celle que se devouer à la protection des Français est la plus noble mission qui soit [I know that your choice to be commissaire rests in a profound conviction; that to protect the French is the most noble

²¹⁸ Sarkozy, Nicolas. “Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, ministre de l'intérieur, de la sécurité intérieure et des libertés locales, sur les missions et les compétences des commissaires de police et sur le projet de réforme de l'architecture des corps de la police nationale, à Saint-Cyr-au-Mont-d'Or.” le 24 juin 2003 [Internet]. Available from <http://discours-publics.viepublique.fr/rechlogos/servlet/GetFiche?fiche=033002045>, 1.

mission there is,” providing the ultimate vindication of a French national identity that is also undeniably tied to national security²¹⁹.

The speech goes on to exclaim a need to keep an open perspective in order to identify the best techniques to succeed in the 21st century domains of terrorism and cybercrimes, and that in Sarkozy’s spirit this measure to be in the National Police force “signifie clairement que vos responsabilités sont celles de la Haute fonction publique [clearly signifies that your responsibilities are those of the highest public function]”²²⁰. Not only does this reinforce the public good while addressing government legitimacy, but Sarkozy finishes with the incredible conclusion of how “Au nom de tous les Français, je vous en remercie. [In the name of all the French, I thank you.]” to reaffirm the collective French solidarity permeating not only this government institution, but the values it embodies as a cultural symbol (3).

2004 – “Mission Securite”

As a main document that presents how the Ministry of the Interior (Domestic Affairs) is working to provide greater security for France, the “Mission Securite” unveils to the public a pleasantly organized display of government security measures drawing upon various other government strategies and discourses. First and foremost, its title is quickly followed by the statement “des moyens nouveaux pour lutter contre le terrorisme et le crime organisé [new methods to fight against terrorism and organized crime],” clearly highlighting

²¹⁹ Sarkozy, “Declaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy...a Saint-Cyr-au-Mont-d’Or,” 1.

²²⁰ Ibid., 2.

the objective of this statement²²¹. The first national initiative this mission mentions is that of Vigipirate.

Using its level of colors as discussed previously in this project, Vigipirate allows for the government to increase considered measures of action depending on its subjective yet legitimate evaluation of the current situation's potential menace²²². Along with Vigipirate, the Interior Ministry praises the reinforced inter-ministerial nature of government resources, enabling the coordination for example of the gendarmerie units (previously isolated under Defense) with judicial activities²²³. There is a strong element in this discourse that focuses on the increasingly connected nature of government institutional arms and corresponding institutional powers in the name of protecting the French self and its fundamental right to existence as a stable democracy.

Not only does this discourse understandably focus on major shifts to coordinate resources of the Interior Ministry, but it also touches on the actual nature of terrorist threats. The Mission Securite states that more and more, threats with the potential to affect domestic security are finding their origin outside of the national territory²²⁴. It is close to this comment, ironically, that for the first time in an official French discourse in this project there is explicit reference to *le nationalisme corse* [Corse nationalism] or *le nationalisme basque* [Basque nationalism] in addition to radical Islam as sources of French terrorist threats²²⁵. Why have the examples of Corsica and the Basque region not showed up as part of the fight against terrorism in French discourses until now? Based on the frequently seen concept of a

²²¹ "MISSION SECURITE: Ordre Public et Protection de la Souverainete." Minister of the Interior Website, 2004, 12.

²²² Ibid., 13.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid.

“new”, non-traditional terrorism, mass terrorism, or “international” terrorism, perhaps such nationalistic terrorist movements as the Basques or the Corsicans are being consciously separated from movements that are not particularly territorial in nature. Despite this potential distinction in “root causes,” are not all three equally threatening dangers to French national security?

July 2005 – Sarkozy Response to London Bombings

After the London bombings of July 7, 2005, the Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy was interviewed by one of the major French television stations, France 2, by reporter David Pujadas. With respect to the bombers involved in the London attack, Sarkozy responds that “les appeler terroristes c’est encore trop indulgent, parce que ce voudrait dire qu’il y a une idéologie derriere, il n’y a pas d’idéologie, ce sont des assassins qui ne respectent rien ni personne [to call them terrorists would be still too indulgent because that would say that there was an ideology behind the act, but there is no ideology, they are assassins who respect for no thing or person]”²²⁶. In so stating, Sarkozy is establishing conditions for the “French Self”/”Terrorist Other” dichotomy that revolve not only around actual criminal offenses, but also around the ideological backing of such offenses.

Despite this linguistic effort to provide a more concrete image of the “terrorist other”, it is no easy task due to the far-reaching, somewhat abstract nature of “terrorist” as a stable identity marker. Consequently, Sarkozy ignores the “them” in favor of an opportunity to establish the “us”. He states that “ce qui s’est passé a New York, ce qui s’est passé a

²²⁶ Sarkozy, Nicolas. “Intervention de M. Nicolas Sarkozy Ministre d’Etat, Ministre de l’Interieur et de l’Aménagement du Territoire sur France 2 le jeudi 7 juillet 2005 a 20 H 00.” [Internet]. Available from http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/misill/sections/a_1_interieur/le_ministre/dans_les_medias/archives/france-2/view. Televised interview with Sarkozy, July 7 2005, 1.

Madrid, ce qui s'est passé a Londres aujourd'hui, a qui nous disons bien sur toute notre solidarité, notre compassion, se passe dans des démocraties, la France est une démocratie [what happened in New York, what happened in Madrid, what happened in London today, that speaks of course to our complete solidarity and compassion, is what happens in democracies, and France is a democracy]²²⁷. This paints a picture of the “us” as democratic states with the terrorist “other” as certainly distinct from that democratic solidarity. Ironically, to be found out later on after this interview, is that the bombers were in fact British citizens and participants in the British, western, democracy.

While Sarkozy denies any precise terrorist threat against France at the time of this interview, he explains that all the government resources are in place as the power to trap terrorists before they attack is of key importance to success, justifying the deployment of government power and authority even when no specific danger is lurking around the French territorial existence²²⁸. In justification of this government embodiment of increasing power and resources, he goes on to explain how over the past two to three years the French government stopped multiple “equipes [teams]” in the French cities of Romainville, Limoges, and Montpellier, where they were said to know how to make explosives²²⁹. Interestingly, when questioned if those teams were in fact terrorist cells, his response was not a simple yes or no, rather, he went on to state somewhat arrogantly to the reporter “Ecoutez, quand on a des recettes pour constituer des explosifs, quand on trouve chez eux des elements pour constituer les explosifs, on peut penser qu'ils ne plaisantent pas. Et par consequent, pour nous, la menace existe. [Listen, when someone has recipes to make

²²⁷ “Intervention de M. Nicolas Sarkozy...sur France 2 le jeudi 7 juillet 2005 a 20 H 00,” 1.

²²⁸ Ibid., 2.

²²⁹ Ibid.

explosives, when someone has at their house the necessary ingredients to make explosives, one can think that those people aren't joking. Consequently, for us, the threat exists."²³⁰

This response is perhaps one of the most intriguing of the entire discourse of this public interview. Sarkozy is responding to an attack in London that was deemed by most of the international community to be a terrorist threat without calling it terrorism, while also discussing a French government successes in stopping potentially terrorist "teams" without ever calling those national instances terrorist-based. In sum, he is justifying and legitimizing government policy due to a realistic terrorist threat without every actually using that terminology in cases. It is as if he is shying away from any definition of terrorism while implying its presence in policy decision-making processes all along.

Sarkozy goes on to explain the risk France faces to terrorism due to its nature as a democracy. He states that the enemy to terrorists is democracy, human rights, and freedom, and consequently, the enemy is France²³¹. As far as questions regarding specific French policy stemming from Vigipirate in the time of the London attacks, Sarkozy explained that the movement of the Vigipirate color level would be not just a technical troop deployment and resource mobilisation, but also "une facon de dire aux francais que chacun d'entre nous on est comptable de la securite de l'autre, que sans panique, sans changer ses habitudes, il faut etre vigilant, il faut faire attention [a way to say to the French people that each of us is responsible for the security of the other, that without panicking or changing habits, one must be vigilant, one must pay attention]"²³². Incredibly, Sarkozy is legitimizing the use of the Plan Vigipirate to the public, with its corresponding distribution of increasing power and

²³⁰ "Intervention de M. Nicolas Sarkozy...sur France 2 le jeudi 7 juillet 2005 a 20 H 00," 2.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

authority to the state, through the conscious *use* of the public response itself as reinforcement for material justification and legitimacy. While clearly the Interior Minister of the 21st century has made strides to reinforce French identity and corresponding political legitimacy, how have military initiatives evolved five years into this millennia?

November 2005 – The Defense Minister Speaks

The French Minister of Defense, Michele Alliot-Marie, addressed the state and the public regarding domestic security in the face of the terrorist threat. Without wasting any time her discourse focused directly on a statistic that in 2005, almost “nine in ten French people (86%)” believe that the use of the French army is a priority in the fight against terrorism²³³. After this reference to 2005 public opinion, the text goes back in history to 1959 for a statement of the role of the Defense as “d’assurer en tout temps, en toutes circonstance et contre toutes les formes d’agression, la securite et l’integrité du territoire ainsi de la vie de la population [to assure at all times, in all circumstances and against all types of aggression, the security and integrity of the territory as well as the life of the population]”²³⁴. In two phrases the Minister of Defense has reinforced existing policies to strengthen the military through a contemporary reference to the public belief as well as a historical link to the foundation of Defense and government as existing but for the people and the state, with both as strategic reinforcements of a distinct French identity.

She continues to speak with particular time frames in mind, the next symbolic instance being that of September 11th. While she says that the Ministry of Defense was participating in the fight against terrorism before September 11, 2001, the use of this date in

²³³ Alliot-Marie, Michele. “Les Français face au terrorisme.” Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la securite interieure face au terrorisme, Paris le 17 novembre 2005, 1.

²³⁴ Ibid.

a discussion of the role of the Defense in providing national security domestically is an important element of this linguistic trajectory²³⁵. Even though she discusses how the French defense forces and government were already “in” on this struggle against terrorism, the tool that is used to justify such intrusive and power-laden state involvement at the present is not a historical moment in French history on French soil, such as the four months of attacks in Paris 1995, rather, a day in New York and Washington across the pond.

After inciting the images all too familiar from September 11th, she continues her forceful conviction of the importance for defense in stating how the struggle against terrorism is a daily [quotidienne] struggle that demands an engagement of “tous nos moyens [all our means]” and that most importantly “toutefois, avec l’évolution récente de la menace terroriste, le volet militaire prend aujourd’hui une importance nouvelle [each time, with the recent evolution of the terrorist menace, the military today takes on a new importance]”²³⁶. This mention of some kind of *daily* aspect with regard to counter-terrorism measures sparks a memory of 2001 legislative initiatives as well as other official discourses previously discussed that made an effort to incorporate citizen responsibility and community into traditional fights for national security.

In addition to the military taking on a new importance in this fight, she explains that “cette nebuleuse n’est pas structurée comme les groupes terroristes “traditionnels” [these global networks are not structured like “traditional” terrorist groups]”²³⁷. Here she makes a clear distinction that this fight drawing on new military importance and resources is in large part rooted in the “non-traditional” nature of terrorism in the 21st century. Creating a new

²³⁵ Alliot-Marie, 1.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

intersubjective meaning for a term such as “terrorist” that has been used in past discourses may seem a difficult task, but from this defense dialogue reveals itself to be almost carefree as using vague explanations with dramatic undertones provides a rather clean presentation of the threat.

She goes on in this display of a new terrorism through her use of the phrase “mass terrorism,” seen previously in French official discourse, in presenting how terrorism today wants to “fragiliser de façon décisive les institutions et les systèmes démocratiques [decisively weaken democratic institutions and systems]”²³⁸. Instead of any definition of “traditional” terrorism to aid her argument, she just continues to express how invaluable the Ministry of Defense is in this fight now. Stating that not only does the heart of the French collective response depend on the Defense, but that because the menace has evolved “la Defense occupe une place de plus en plus importante dans la lutte contre le terrorisme [the Defence occupies a place of greater and greater importance in the fight against terrorism]”²³⁹. With the Defense Ministry continuing to grow in material importance, it is simultaneously constructing and re-establishing its place as a source of non-material power and identity for the French state.

This would seem to say that as long as resources continue to expand the material power and capability of the Defense ministry, people can assume that the terrorist threat is continuing to evolve in such a way as to pose a greater and greater threat, even if the only concrete “evidence” of this growth in threat is the language surrounding national security discourses. Consequently, this particular discourse would seem to reinforce the theoretical

²³⁸ Alliot-Marie, 2.

²³⁹ Ibid.

idea that language and the national security threat of terrorism are mutually reinforcing concepts simultaneously creating and justifying new state powers.

Interestingly, she concludes this speech of the role of Defense in 2005 by again speaking of how terrorism presents itself today, assumedly this is opposed to historical varieties. She states that “terroristes d’aujourd’hui n’ont pas de cause politique légitime à défendre...Ils prennent pour cibles nos modes de vie, nos valeurs, nos libertés [terrorists of today don’t have any legitimate political cause to defend...They take as targets our ways of life, our values, our freedoms]”²⁴⁰. It is here that the language does a similar feat to previous discourses in that it justifies the existence of a distinct, contemporary terrorist threat through the use of a definition seeming to be all-encompassing and against every possible piece of intersubjective knowledge the audience may have at their emotional disposal from their “way of life” to their “freedoms,” and the rhetorical coercion shines on.

Analytic Reflection on the French Case

As viewed in the above investigation into official discourses surrounding the evolution of French state power in light of 21st century counter-terrorism demands, the French government is in line with Britain in its current and successful objective of increasing state authority. In searching for a greater understanding of how these changes to state capacity were so quickly passed and accepted, the textual analysis presented interesting perspectives into how language power can in fact provide the necessary leverage for government initiatives that at first glance are rather controversial.

It was expected to see within the French discourses explicit mentions and discussions of France’s historical experiences with terrorism, and in particular, with terrorism

²⁴⁰ Alliot-Marie, 4.

stemming from various Algerian groups within France. Interestingly, the French case mirrors that of the British in how officials chose to deploy September 11th as a rhetorical tool more frequently and within more dramatic contexts than any discussion of past terrorist activity on French soil. While there were a few discussions of such attacks, they were made within a context that had the explicit goal of justifying French solidarity with the United States after 9/11 as well as French solidarity with the international community's fight against global terrorism.

Also similar to the British case, when linguistic patterns focused on a collective international fight encompassing free, democratic states against terrorist activities, arose in the discourses, there was no corresponding material or institutional conclusion presented. Rather, there was a return to the proclamation of how necessary French state institutions and resources are in order to protect the French daily life and provide the government's number one mission, security to its people. French officials simultaneously seem to frame the "terrorist other" as both an international threatening other that demands an international response, as well as a domestic threat in need of greater French state capability.

In identification of the terrorist security threat as affecting day-to-day lives of French citizens, the discourses deploy a rhetorical coercion that invokes the government's noble duty to protect its territory and people, and consequently, to protect its very existence and unique national identity. With most of the legitimation struggle taking place within a context of preventive measures, the lack of any factual evidence to such security threats was trumped by an overwhelming focus on the French state as protector of the French and their way of life, with no realistic space for an acceptable rebuttal to changing policy.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Analysis from Britain to France

State power and corresponding institutional existence in Britain and France has been and continues to be reinforced through processes of 21st century counter-terrorism strategies and their corresponding legitimization struggles. With a linguistic focus from both governments on the need to provide protection of their respective democratic social and political ways of life, Britain and France have successfully passed rather controversial government initiatives with intense material effects on society through a return to vast and often unchecked government power and authority. The strengthening of national state institutions and capacity is somewhat unexpected due to ever-changing notions of state boundaries, especially in light of increasing European integration, and one wonders if such a focus on the unavoidably vague terrorist other is a mechanism from which state officials hope to maintain a certain control over their respective societies, economies, and political realms.

Even as the documented potential for a terrorist threat continues to remain hidden from the public, in part due to the nature of intelligence and counter-terrorism in general, both Britain and France have found a way through deployments of rhetorical coercion and other linguistic mechanisms to convincingly alter policy in favor of increasing state authority and relevance. Through methods of identity construction and an emphasis on the “us” in both cases as democratic societies in need of protection from terrorists, these two European

states have created a discursive process that restructures their respective national identities while reinforcing the material resources bestowed upon state officials and institutions.

As historical experiences in Britain and France have largely been left out of 21st century discourses, there is the use of previously familiar terrorist rhetoric in completely new linguistic contexts providing a new national security terminology from which to construct intersubjective understandings from government officials to citizens on the street. No longer does terrorism incite visions of the IRA or Algerian attacks, rather, terrorism is a contemporary, global threat requiring new security measures in order to preserve the self. As seen in the official texts of this project, the highlighted self from legislative documents to military speeches is the state-level, national self. Even though terrorism is discussed as an international problem, based on the texts from this investigation, its solution resides in domestic powers and authority.

Implications and Weaknesses of the Project

This discourse analysis of British and French counter-terrorism strategies and corresponding legitimacy struggles has presented many more questions with respect to how governments are currently aiding in contemporary processes of identity construction through their linguistic tools and national security strategies. While there are some scholars who discuss the potential of a European identity to take root and others who zero in on various subnational identities in dissecting multilevel governance structures, the textual analysis in this project highlights an increasing priority by those in positions of material and ideational power on the state as the major source of collective identity.

The continued presence of national identity is not a huge surprise, however, it is important to have a better understanding of how that national sense of self evolves in legitimization struggles that involve serious and controversial measures affecting these societies. With the July 7, 2005 London bombers being of British nationality and societal cleavages literally erupting in flames in Paris during the fall of 2005, there is an intense and worrisome dynamic taking place within the boundaries of Britain and France that needs attention. Could a strengthening of national identity in these two states as a response to terrorist threats become a source of socio-political collective bonding to alleviate some of these state's domestic frustrations? Or, would a focus on the existence of a unique, national self, overly depend on certain intersubjective meanings that reinforce dangerous social cleavages?

With the terrorist other not seeming to go away any time soon, much work needs to continue to be done in order to better understand the relationship between national security discourses, their material effects and contemporary identity construction. While the focus of this project has been Britain and France, it would be interesting to investigate other democratic states to see how their policies and corresponding official discourses have evolved in such a way to invoke certain identity constructions. Additionally, a more comprehensive discourse analysis demands a greater pool of textual resources from which to investigate linguistic patterns and contextual evolutions. While this project tried to take a sample of texts from various elements of British and French official arenas, there never seems to be a satisfying level of material for the researcher concerned with the best possible set of empirical tools.

Despite this concluding acknowledgement of various holes in the research as well as continued theoretical questions, this project provided an interesting framework from which to investigate such traditional and intriguing themes in international relations as national security, elements of power, and identity construction.

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